Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

JTF Haiti

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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

The ability to deploy and sustain air, land, and sea forces to any region of the world for missions spanning the operational continuum is known as force projection. U.S. force projection emphasizes rapid deployment, quick termination of conflicts on terms favorable to the United States, and minimal casualties, both friendly and enemy.

Force projection is the process by which units plan, deploy, conduct operations, conclude operations and redeploy. It is necessary in all four stages of AirLand operations:

Stage I - *Detection and Preparation*. After assessing the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available, units are tailored and prepared for deployment. To the extent possible, the senior commander develops a clear definition of the desired end state and determines the correct mix of forces and their proper arrival sequence.

Stage II - *Establishing the Conditions for Decisive Operations*. After initial deployment, the commander focuses on building the capabilities of his force. If operations have not yet begun, he may attempt to gain a positional advantage or to build up force to deter a potential adversary.

Stage III - *Decisive Operations*. Forces accomplish the mission rapidly, interacting with allied services and forces from other nations.

Stage IV - *Force Reconstitution*. Units resolve the conflict, restore combat power, prepare for future operation and redeploy.

Global force projections of Army units will always be joint operations with Air Force, Navy or commercial strategic lift, and Army units must maintain a state of readiness with an emphasis on proper training.

Sustainment of force projection requires a joint theater-logistics structure capable of joint responsibilities. This structure must be established simultaneously with those for operational- and tactical-level logistics.

The concept of force projection must be included when developing doctrine, training, leadership, organizational structure, and materiel. In doctrine, force projection will provide the entire force with a common terminology and established procedures. Proper training will prepare the force and enhance its readiness. In the organizational structure, the basic force-projection unit will comprise elements from the active component. The Army must continue to exploit the technological strengths of its weapons and equipment; these will help compensate for the possibility that smaller numbers of forces may be required to fight, even when outnumbered.

The Army has demonstrated its ability to project forces in the recent past. Its future challenge is to maintain and enhance this expertise in its transition to a smaller, increasingly CONUS-based force.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

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

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Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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JTF Haiti:

A United Nations Foreign Internal Defense Mission

by Lt. Col. Stephen M. Epstein, Lt. Col. Robert S. Cronin and Col. James G. Pulley

Thursday, Oct. 14, 1993, Port-au-Prince, Haiti — On this day, Canadian Air Force engineers, U.S. Navy Seabees, Haitian military engineers and public-works personnel should have begun the renovation of the Lycée Antenor Firmin, a boys' public high school located next door to the Ministry of Justice. Instead, a hundred meters away, Justice Minister Guy Malary and two of his staff were machine-gunned by paramilitary auxiliaries of the Port-au-Prince police force. The contrast between what should have happened and what actually happened dramatizes the demise of a good foreign-internal-defense mission that was in the right place at the wrong time.

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president of Haiti on Dec. 16, 1990, by 67 percent of the vote — the largest majority for any head of state then serving in the Western Hemisphere. Two months later, he took office as the first democratically elected head of state in the history of



A crewman on the USS Harlan County guides a forklift full of supplies aboard the ship in preparation for the humanitarian mission to Haiti.

DoD photo

Haiti, the second oldest republic in the hemisphere, independent since 1804. After only seven months in office, Aristide was deposed in the bloody military coup of Sept. 30, 1991, which ushered in a period of violence, international isolation and economic misery.

Nearly two years later, on July 3, 1993, Lt. Gen. Raoul Cédras, commander in chief of the Forces Armées d'Haiti, or FAD'H, the Haitian armed forces, bowed to the pressure of a United Nations embargo and joined President Aristide in signing the Governors Island Accord, a 10-step plan to return Haiti to democratic rule. On Sept. 23, 1993, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 867 authorizing an expanded mission in support of the transition. Thirteen days later, the advance party of Joint Task Force Haiti flew into Port-au-Prince International Airport.

Mission

The more general U.N. mission in Haiti had begun a year earlier, in September 1992, with the arrival of 18 observers to monitor and report on human-rights abuses. By the time the Governors Island Accord was signed, the number of observers had increased to about 200, and they were called the International Civilian Mission, or ICM. At the heart of the accord lay the need to remove the Haitian police from the control of the Haitian military. To accomplish this, two other components were added to the existing U.N. mission. The first was the International Police Monitors, or IPM, consisting of a nucleus of 100 Royal Canadian Mounted Police and 476 French gendarmes, with additional police from Argentina, Algeria and other French-speaking U.N. member states, whose mission was to establish and train an independent, professional, civilian police force. The second component was Joint Task Force Haiti, consisting of 599 U.S. and 110 Canadian military personnel, whose mission statement read, "On order, JTF Haiti deploys to Haiti under United Nations operational control and conducts military training and humanitarian/civic action programs in support of Haitian democratization." The IPM was to begin work after President Aristide's planned return on Oct. 30. The JTF mission, projected to last 179 days, was to be under way by the middle of October.

The JTF Haiti mission fit the classic FID profile, undertaking civic-action programs designed to help a friendly government solidify its position, protect itself from subversion and lawlessness and mobilize popular support by improving conditions for its people. The mission offered a unique opportunity to demonstrate the viability of a complete package of special-operations forces, calling for a blend of the specific capabilities of soldiers in Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

Special Forces

The task of providing training to professionalize the FAD'H was assigned to 100 soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group. Training was to begin with Haitian troops garrisoned in the Port-au-Prince area, the country's political center of gravity. Later, 12-man A-detachments would deploy throughout the country to work with soldiers in the eight remaining military districts. In the more remote areas, these trainers, together with Haitian troops, would also coordinate and execute small-scale humanitarian and civic-action projects.

The first step in designing the training program was to determine the skills appropriate for a reformed Haitian military that had given up its police function and had shifted its purpose to serving the

U.S. Army photo

A Special Forces instructor teaches land navigation to a group of foreign soldiers.

needs of Haitian constitutional authority. Training was to focus on coastal and frontier security, disaster relief and search-and-rescue operations. Soldiers would be taught land navigation, operations in darkness, patrolling techniques, rappelling, helicopter-supported operations and battlefield trauma treatment. They would learn discipline and pride through training in physical fitness, drill and ceremonies, military appearance and deportment, the chain of command and the role of a soldier in a democracy. The objective of this training would be to establish an army respected for its ability to serve and protect Haitian society instead of one feared for its ability to terrorize that society at gunpoint.

The goal of reforming the Haitian army into a force respectful of human rights, loyal to its chain of command and responsible to constitutional authority could clearly not be completed in six months. However, the Special Forces soldiers could have convinced the soldiers of the FAD'H that they would benefit from committing themselves to the process. A more professional army is better able to feed, clothe, house, pay and care for its members and enjoys higher morale and prestige.

The most compelling reason, however, for Haitian soldiers to want to professionalize themselves was fear: They held on to their privileged position by terrorizing the Haitian population. During his presidency, Aristide took political steps to undermine the power of the military. In turn, the military, fearing that the tiger it was riding was getting out of control, tightened its grip with a coup d'etat. A conspicuous professionalization program would have offered Haitian soldiers an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the public, to relax their grip and to dismount from the tiger in safety. Working and training side by side with professional role models of discipline, integrity, competence, toughness and dedication to duty, the Haitian soldiers could have learned to take pride in these virtues and to build their self-respect and public image upon them. Once the FAD'H had become interested in professionalizing itself, follow-on military training missions could have completed the task.

Civil Affairs

A heavy Civil Affairs involvement was required for designing, coordinating and managing the humanitarian and civic-action components of the JTF Haiti mission. HCA projects were intended to create small but sustainable improvements in the lives of the Haitian people. Medical assistance, for example, focused on providing training to health-care providers rather than on treating patients. Five Canadians and 36 Americans — community health nurses, preventive-medicine technicians, general practitioners, environmental health specialists, an entomologist, and a veterinarian — were drawn from all services of the armed forces. They would work with the Ministry of

Health and the University of Haiti, teaching public health to medical and nursing students and developing a training program for health-service providers in the field. Even before the arrival of the advance party, Civil Affairs officers in country had begun to establish the necessary contacts with Haitian authorities and experts to help the medical staff devise a plan that would meet Haitian needs and that would work harmoniously with existing Haitian institutions.

Engineering HCA projects focused on the renovation of schools as a way of making a modest but lasting contribution to Haiti's future. These projects also served as a symbol of the friendly intent of the U.N. mission and as an opportunity for the FAD'H to demonstrate a new commitment to promoting the interests of the people of Haiti. Working with the Haitian ministries of Education, Public Works, and Health, as well as with concerned Haitian engineers and architects, Civil Affairs officers put together a list of eight schools and one hospital to be renovated in the Port-au-Prince area. They would have established coordination between their Haitian points of contact, the U.S. Navy Seabees and Canadian Air Force engineers who were to complete the work with the Public Works Ministry and FAD'H military engineers.

The medical and engineering projects were phased to begin in Port-au-Prince and later extend throughout the country. As activities became more decentralized, 16 soldiers of E Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, organized into four direct-support teams and deployed into outlying regions, were to coordinate these projects with local authorities. They would also survey the needs and the resources of the outlying regions in an effort to identify additional worthwhile projects.

Civil Affairs carries doctrinal responsibility for liaison with local authorities, international organizations and U.S. agencies. Although the JTF Haiti liaison officers had only begun to develop their relationships when the U.N. mission unraveled, their roles were validated during their brief period of operation.

Field-grade officers from the Army Reserve's 358th Civil Affairs Brigade were selected to serve as liaison officers with five activities: the office of the Deputy for Peacekeeping Operations, or DPKO, at U.N. headquarters in New York; the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince; the IPM; the ICM; and the FAD'H general staff. The ICM liaison officer was originally expected to extend his coverage to nongovernmental organizations, the U.S. Information Service, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as the mission matured. Instead, he became

U.S. Army photo

Training local health-care providers is one way in which medical civic-action programs can improve the lives of the host-nation population.

U.S. Army photo

A U.S. soldier and a Thai civilian work together during an engineering civic-action program.

the JTF representative to the U.N. security-management team. The FAD'H liaison officer was shifted to the U.N. special envoy when the FAD'H proved to be unwilling to communicate.

Each liaison officer found that the agency to which he was dispatched was eager for a direct channel of communication with the JTF commander. The officer assigned to U.N. headquarters learned that the DPKO military adviser was especially pleased with the new link. Because the DPKO adviser had been receiving reports only though routine U.N. distribution channels, with his attention divided among 70,000 troops deployed around the world, he had found it difficult to keep abreast of developments in Haiti.

Each liaison officer discovered that his civilian background was invaluable in establishing rapport. At the U.S. Embassy, where the staff was overloaded by the additional needs of the U.N. mission, the JTF liaison officer began coordinating support requirements. He was immediately productive because of the experience he had gained as a reservist during a two-week tour in the embassy just before the 1991 coup. The ICM liaison officer defused an initial hostility to all things military by stressing his status as a "citizen soldier" reservist and his civilian involvement with the American Red Cross. Drawing on his credentials as a Philadelphia assistant district attorney with experience "on the street," the IPM liaison established a bond with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The remaining liaison officer had expected to use the cross-cultural experience he had gained as an anthropologist to improve communications with the FAD'H. Instead, he found it useful in the unfamiliar, intercultural world of the United Nations.

The JTF commander met with his liaison officers daily. More than just occasions for liaison reports and the commander's guidance, the meetings became true seminars and valuable additions to the mission's planning and analysis process. The liaison officers took turns organizing each day's agenda around a theme, moderating debates and keeping discussions on track. These sessions were freewheeling exchanges of ideas and information that helped the liaison officers to understand the commander's intent, allowed the commander to test his thoughts on a friendly yet critical audience, and enabled everyone to view the daily events in a clearer perspective.

Psychological operations

Haiti offered an ideal environment for PSYOP employment: Literacy is low, and Haitian society relies on word-of-mouth communication. Official broadcasts and publications are viewed with suspicion. Rumors are the preferred source of information, and their credibility is judged by how well the listener knows the person repeating them.

A military information support team of 10 soldiers from the 9th Battalion, 4th

Psychological Operations Group, was scheduled to deploy on D-21 to begin an information campaign for three audiences. To the Haitian military, it would communicate the benefits of professionalization. To the police, it would communicate the desirability of separation from the army. And to the population at large, it would communicate confidence in the democratic process. A comprehensive publicity program using radio, television and newspapers was designed to support the medical- and engineering-assistance projects. The U.S. Information Service, staffed by only two public-affairs officers, prepared to welcome the members of the team and to make its facilities available to them.

Unfortunately, the U.S. and the U.N. never became players in the information campaign. The deployment of PSYOP personnel was delayed first by the U.S. country team in Haiti and later by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The reluctance to use PSYOP stemmed partly from a concern that "psychological operations" would be perceived badly by the international community and partly from an uneasiness that PSYOP might be associated with "propaganda." Changes in terminology were debated: The military information support team was renamed an information support team and, finally, a public-awareness liaison, or PAL. Perhaps, too, the country team and the Office of the Secretary of Defense were guided by a faith that the truth would be its own best advertisement.

In fact, the truth was never communicated. The first four soldiers of PAL did not arrive in Haiti until D-1, the day before the USS Harlan County attempted to dock in Port-au-Prince. This was long after any effective information-management actions could have been taken. By then, the opponents of President Aristide were firmly in control of the flow of information, and the U.S. and the U.N. simply did not compete.

U.S. Army photo

Soldiers of the 4th PSYOP Group examine materials being developed for use in an information campaign.

Problems

As advance-party personnel continued to coordinate the military professionalization and HCA projects, they encountered increasing resistance. The FAD'H general staff interpreted the word "modernization," appearing in U.N. Resolution 867, to mean that the Haitian army should be given more and better lethal weapons systems. Attempts to schedule professionalization training were repeatedly countered by requests for tanks, self-propelled artillery, attack helicopters and fighter-bombers. The FAD'H employed a variety of stalling tactics. At meetings, their representatives filibustered, withheld information and denied having the authority to take any constructive action. Understandings reached at one meeting evaporated by the next meeting. It became clear that the JTF was operating in a political climate that the diplomatic strategists had neither predicted nor planned for.

Military planners, assuming that the signing of the Governors Island Accord

meant that both the Aristide and FAD'H factions had reached a willingness to cooperate, expected the mission to be carried out in a permissive environment. However, President Aristide's heated rhetoric continued, uniting factions opposed to his regime. At the same time, members of the FAD'H remained reluctant to surrender their power and profit and genuinely feared for their lives should President Aristide return to power. Without examining in detail the motivations and the mutual mistrust of these factions, it is sufficient to say that neither side cooperated fully in the transition to a democratic government.

The Governors Island Accord had established a time line for this transition: On Oct. 15, key members of the FAD'H were to resign; on Oct. 30, President Aristide was to return to Haiti. These milestones came to be seen as deadlines. Even though diplomatic progress stalled, the deployment for JTF Haiti continued as scheduled. Diplomats hoped the presence of a U.N. military force would somehow drag the diplomatic process forward and create a more secure environment. Instead, diplomatic progress remained stalled, and the environment became even more dangerous.

The JTF thus encountered a situation much different from the one for which it had been configured. Military planners had crafted a task organization to accomplish its objectives in a permissive, cooperative environment. Security of the U.N. military force was to have been the responsibility of the FAD'H. Soldiers of JTF Haiti were permitted to ship but not to carry side arms. When the deteriorating environment reached the semipermissive stage, it was too late to reconfigure the force package and impossible to clear a politically sensitive increase in defensive-weapons capability with the diplomats of the U.S. country team, the United Nations, and the de facto military government of Haiti.

The violent demonstrations by the armed paramilitary organizations that greeted the USS Harlan County in Port-au-Prince harbor on D-Day, Oct. 11, 1993, made it clear that the circumstances in country had changed dramatically from those reported and upon which plans had been based. The U.N. mission began to dissolve rapidly. On Tuesday, Oct. 12, the ship was ordered to depart, still loaded with the personnel and materiel needed to begin the training, medical and construction projects. The next day, the French government withheld a contingent of gendarmes scheduled to join the IPM. Thursday morning, Oct. 14, the Canadian government withdrew the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and in the afternoon, paramilitary auxiliaries assassinated Justice Minister Malary. Some members of the ICM began catching flights out of Port-au-Prince International Airport. Others convoyed overland into the Dominican Republic, fortunately without incident. The convoys had to travel without security because the U.N. military contingent had not been allowed to bring into Haiti sufficient personnel or weapons to protect them.

Saturday morning, Oct. 16, after the final two chartered aircraft — filled with women, children and nonessential U.N. civilians — had departed, a U.S. Navy C-9 Nightingale arrived at Port-au-Prince International Airport to extract the advance party of JTF Haiti and to unload a team of 25 well-armed U.S. Marines brought in to reinforce the American Embassy's security detachment — the right force package for an environment that had turned violent.

Conclusions

Since the events of October 1993, Haiti has again been ostracized by the international community. A combined naval task

force is tightening a new U.N. embargo around the country. Diplomatic efforts continue. Eventually, the situation in Haiti may reach a point where all parties will genuinely desire an accord. Perhaps in a truly permissive environment, a Joint Task Force Haiti II may be possible.

If another mission is undertaken, its planners should heed the lessons learned from JTF Haiti. The new JTF should be carefully configured and include an organic security capability. It should be deployed into an environment that has been well-prepared diplomatically, and it should be supported by a strong PSYOP effort. If the lessons learned from JTF Haiti are exploited, then a JTF Haiti II, integrating the capabilities of Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP, can make a valuable contribution in establishing a lasting Haitian democracy.

Lt. Col. Stephen M. Epstein, currently assigned to the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, was part of the JTF Haiti advance party. During Operation Provide Comfort, he served as mayor of a 5,000-person Kurdish refugee camp in Zakho and commanded the Residual Civil Affairs Detachment in Dohuk, Iraq. He holds a Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Pennsylvania.

Lt. Col. Robert S. Cronin, currently assigned to the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, was part of the JTF Haiti advance party. He has served on active duty in Korea, commanded a military-intelligence detachment and served on the general staff of the 79th Army Reserve Command. He is a graduate of the University of Delaware, and his civilian career has been in commercial finance, insurance and real estate.

Col. James G. Pulley, currently assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, commanded the U.N. military contingent and the JTF advance party in Haiti. He has commanded Special Forces A- and B-detachments, a mechanized infantry company and a cohort Bradley battalion in the 2nd Armor Division and the 2nd Armor Division (Forward). Most recently, he was commander of the 7th Special Forces Group. He is a graduate of the Army War College and holds a master's degree in public administration.

perspective

JTF Haiti: Lasting Impressions

by Navy Lt. Tonya H. Wakefield

In a steadily worsening political situation, the advance party of Joint Task Force Haiti faced numerous difficulties in ensuring the safety of its troops, yet it made significant mission progress during its short time in country.

The task-force commander and five staff personnel arrived in Port-au-Prince Oct. 4, eleven days prior to the scheduled resignation of Lt. Gen. Raoul Cédras, Haiti's military leader and the spearhead of the 1991 coup. In Port-au-Prince, the six joined a small group of Army Special Forces trainers who for two weeks had been working out of the Villa Creole Hotel. Two days later, the remainder of the advance party arrived, increasing its number to 54. The newcomers were lodged in an old hotel called La Griffonne, but the Villa Creole continued to serve as the center of operations. The advance group prepared for the arrival of the USS Harlan County, which carried approximately 250 United Nations troops as well as construction equipment and materials for the establishment of a base camp.

Even though the civilian government of Haiti was eager to accept our assistance, the lack of FAD'H cooperation was evident. Liaison between the task-force commander, the U.N. special representative, the acting U.S. ambassador and Haitian authorities resulted in a flurry of correspondence concerning preparation for the arrival of U.N. troops. Letters exchanged between the prime minister, the port captain and the U.S. Embassy arranged for the Harlan County's use of pier facilities and informed the FAD'H of the ship's pending arrival and of its security requirements.

But the FAD'H, controlled by Cédras and Lt. Col. Michael Francois, displayed apprehension at the outset, and Cédras publicly referred to the Harlan County's scheduled arrival as an invasion. As of Friday, Oct. 8, the Haitian Army's 52nd Company, controlling access to the international airport, had received no word from FAD'H headquarters regarding efforts to establish the U.N. base camp there.

Our visit to the FAD'H headquarters Friday afternoon was met with mock indifference. We were received politely by Col. Charles Andre of the Haitian Navy, who purported to be the senior officer present and stated that he had received no word regarding the base camp and that little could be done until the following week. Our visit the next day met with an even colder reception. We were eventually escorted to Col. Andre's office, where he launched into a lengthy commentary indicating his personal approval of U.S. intervention but his lack of confidence in the U.N. On our visit to the FAD'H headquarters the day prior to the arrival of the Harlan County, we were made to wait and were not offered seats. After considerable persuasion on our part, one of several guards went upstairs and quickly returned, stating that our point of contact was not there. When we asked about three other officers, including the officer of the day, he gave the same response, without checking to see whether they were present.

On Oct. 11, the Harlan County attempted to dock and was met by several armed

patrol boats and a crowd of angry protesters. The ship was soon diverted back to Guantanamo Bay. Its departure and the lack of U.S. resolve were treated as a FAD'H victory in the local press.

The advance party was left in a precarious situation, armed with only 9mm pistols and lodged in two separate locations. Its leadership now faced the challenge of maintaining morale in a rapidly deteriorating political environment and ensuring that cooler heads would prevail. Given the unit's noncombatant structure and limited firepower, a moment of panic on anyone's part could have been devastating. Amid the constant sound of gunshots and vivid press accounts of the Haitian Minister of Defense's assassination, the group's leaders succeeded in maintaining morale and discipline through a combination of personal interaction and leadership by example.

Personal interaction included a knowledge of personal details and the use of humor. Under the circumstances, the importance of "knowing the troops" could not be underestimated, and a well-timed display of a sense of humor served to ease tensions and to build loyalty. Orders and corrections gained emphasis because they came not from a rank or position, but from people whom we knew and respected.

Leadership by example included occasional departures from traditional roles in order to strengthen unit morale and build esprit de corps. While the military rank structure remained intact and discipline was crucial, leaders made certain adaptations to lead effectively in this potentially volatile environment. A prime example was the inclusion of senior officers in the watch rotation at the Villa Creole. Armed sentry watches were established at both hotels, and roving patrols were added later; all personnel were included without exception. Although the additional watch rotations could have been conducted by 0-3s and below, the inclusion of the senior officers boosted morale and stifled complaints.

The real key to maintaining unit morale and avoiding problems was interaction between combat veterans and those with no combat experience. Most of the senior officers and NCOs of the advance party were members of Army Special Forces, and their demeanor was pivotal in maintaining group composure. Regardless of rank, each SF soldier was placed in a de facto leadership role, setting the tone of the unit as a whole. In monitoring radio frequencies, the U.S. Embassy net, and press accounts of shootings and demonstrations, the administrative personnel made an unconscious note of the SF soldiers' reactions. Their overall state of mental preparedness, tempered by caution and situational awareness, was in most cases emulated by the rest of the unit.

Despite the overt lack of FAD'H cooperation, the advance party made considerable progress during its 10-day stay in Port-au-Prince. It selected initial projects from lists provided by Haitian officials, conducted site visits to the first school to be renovated, obtained permission for U.N. medical personnel to visit local hospitals, conducted site surveys of the airfield, and made lists of FAD'H equipment needs, including desired spare parts and technical assistance, in spite of the armed forces' apparent unwillingness to cooperate.

Though its progress was quickly halted, the advance party's accomplishments represented not only a useful lesson in leadership but also a ray of hope for U.S. and Haitian relations. Perhaps the greatest accomplishment was the discovery of the good will and hopeful disposition of the Haitian people. Should the Governors Island Accord be resuscitated or a similar solution be offered in the future, humanitarian and technical-assistance efforts will have a foundation upon which to build. Lessons learned from JTF Haiti will benefit not only the U.S. government and the U.N., but the Haitian people as well.

Navy Lt. Tonya Wakefield was a member of the JTF Haiti advance party. A 1990 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, she is currently assigned to Patrol Squadron 30 at the Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Fla.

U.N. Military Civic Action in Cambodia

by Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Although the United Nations conducted peacekeeping operations throughout the Cold War, little rigorous, analytical thought went into the process. Contributor nations provided units, usually light-infantry battalions, and the U.N. used them in such places as Lebanon, Cyprus and Egypt. The U.N. also borrowed officers from contributor nations to serve as unarmed military observers.

U.N. peacekeeping operations, in general, are still relatively immature. Most officers and soldiers remain untrained in performing peacekeeping functions. There are no required U.N. schools, no U.N. doctrinal staff guides, no recommended tables of organization and equipment, and no strategies or policy guidance for peacekeeping. Each mission literally "starts from scratch," adding to the already ambiguous and confusing peacekeeping circumstances.

Although military civic action should be an essential part of the peacekeeping process, the U.N. has not yet learned their importance, or that they require staffing and budgetary support. This situation must be corrected for the future.

Background

In March 1992, the U.N. deployed the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia, or UNTAC, a peace mission involved in supervising the administration of the country, verifying the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, demobilizing more than 150,000 troops, repatriating more than 350,000 displaced Cambodians and organizing and supervising a national election.

Even without funding, the military component of UNTAC, commanded by Lt. Gen. John Sanderson, an Australian, engaged in numerous civic-action projects. This was made possible through grants of funding and materials from governments of a few of the nations that provided contingent forces. In most cases, however, grants were restricted to areas where a particular government's national contingent was located: The Dutch provided funding to their national contingent battalion. The French contingent battalion received a great deal of support from French nongovernmental charitable organizations. The French and Indian governments provided medical supplies, as did the government of Japan (the Japanese provided 43 tons of medical supplies and medicines), in sufficient quantities to be distributed to every sector. The German government provided funding for pediatric medicines, but only enough to support its medical contingent in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh.

This hodgepodge of funding and material support, although welcome in the provinces where it was provided, created enormous disparities between sectors: the haves and the have-nots. Some battalions

were able to do much in the way of civic action, others very little.

One prominent problem was the lack of pediatric medicines. The fact that as much as 45 percent of the population of Cambodia is under the age of 14, according to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, presented a significant drawback to the UNTAC military physicians who were treating injured and diseased Khmer children.

In many cases military doctors used their battalions' medicines, brought with them from their own countries and meant for the treatment of their own soldiers, for the treatment of Cambodians. Much to their credit, some of the battalion commanders supported their medical personnel's desire to help.

Cambodia's medical problems go far beyond the lack of medicines: There is practically no medical infrastructure in the country. More than 15 years ago, the Khmer Rouge wiped out the educated classes, including the doctors. According to UNTAC's chief medical officer, Col. Peter Fraps, of Germany, "Only 33 of 500 qualified medical practitioners survived the cruel genocide of this country."

UNTAC medical personnel were overwhelmed by the vast medical needs of the local population. In Fraps' words, "The existing health system in Cambodia is deplorable, inhumane, life-condemning and totally bankrupt." Policy guidance from U.N. headquarters New York called for UNTAC military medical personnel to administer to the health needs of UNTAC personnel only. However, with malaria, dengue fever, tuberculosis, anemia and malnutrition endemic to many regions of the country, the military contingent living among the people in the provinces could not ignore those problems.

There is more to civic action than providing medical support to the civil populace. Digging wells (to provide a clean source of drinking water), repairing roads and bridges, building or repairing schools and orphanages, and repairing and refurbishing medical and dental clinics and hospitals are also civic-action activities.

UNTAC engineers built or repaired hundreds of small- and medium-sized bridges and smoothed or resurfaced more than 1,000 miles of roadway. UNTAC funded these projects because they supported free and fair elections. Cambodians had to have a passageway to the polling booths.

My involvement in UNTAC civic action began with a formal proposal to the force commander to create a large civic-action staff. This proposal was not favorably considered for two reasons: First, the submission was tendered in late February 1993 — only three months before the Cambodian elections. Second, UNTAC was not mandated to conduct civic action. The force commander stated that had he received the proposal earlier in the mission, he might have approved a larger civic-action staff.

Photo by Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Khmers line up for medical attention at a mobile medical dispensary run by one of the U.N. battalions.

A subsequent, less ambitious proposal called for the establishment of a force commander's special assistant for civic action, with one officer assistant. On March 1, 1993, Lt. Gen. Sanderson approved the creation of the Civic Action Cell, composed of two officers: myself, with the title civic-action coordinator, and an operations officer. The new CAC worked directly for the chief of staff and reported through him to the force commander.

According to the UNTAC liaison officer at U.N. headquarters New York, this was the first time a peacekeeping mission had established a formal civic-action staff

function. The decision to create a civic-action staff element, despite its size, is a precedent that could prove meaningful to both current and future missions.

There was no small irony in the U.N.'s choice of the operations officer, Maj. Arthur Alexandrov of Russia. Many commented that we were a gratifying, if unlikely, pair — American and Russian officers working together, assisting in the rebuilding of Cambodia. In only a very few years, the world had changed dramatically.

Civic action was being performed by UNTAC well before the proposal of a CAC. The force commander had even appointed a civic-action officer within the Military Public Information Office; however, the job was far too big for one man. Furthermore, the Military Public Information Office was not well-suited for a civic-action officer because his time and energies were sometimes diverted to information priorities. The conduct of civic action must be a separate staff function.

Each of the national contingent battalions had a different idea of what constituted civic action. In every province, there were Pakistani, Japanese, Australian, Chinese, Thai, Indian, Indonesian, Dutch, French, Bulgarian, Malaysian, Uruguayan, Bangladeshi, Ghanian and Tunisian battalions, each with its own national and individual notions about civic action. No policy guidance existed to clarify this situation, and there was no funding; both are essential. Because of this, some battalions limited their activities to rehabilitative programs for cantoned soldiers (cantonment of factional soldiers and weapons was part of the UNTAC mandate). These UNTAC-funded programs included driving schools and classes on metalwork — essentially, job training. Although the projects were satisfactory, they touched the lives of relatively few and had little impact overall.

Other battalions felt that their limited medical civic action fulfilled their civic responsibilities. Because of the lack of medicines and medical personnel, "limited" in some district medical clinics meant administering to not more than 50 Cambodians a day, even though hundreds were turned away.

A cantoned and retrained Cambodian soldier shows off his handiwork at an Indian-run and U.N.-sponsored metalwork training center in Kampong Cham Province.

Photo by Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Methodology

With no staff, except Alexandrov, and no budget, starting out in the CAC seemed like a near-impossible mission. It was clear that whatever might be accomplished had to begin with an assessment. We began by visiting every sector in Cambodia by helicopter.

During our provincial visits, we disseminated a CAC-written, UNTAC civic-action pamphlet outlining the UNTAC philosophy of civic action and the duties and responsibilities of the CAC, sector civic-action coordinators and senior U.N. military observers.

We evaluated both ongoing and planned civic action, briefed officers on the UNTAC civic-action philosophy, advised sector commanders on what support was available from UNTAC headquarters in Phnom Penh, and explained why conducting civic action enhanced a battalion's security posture.

To ensure that every sector commander appointed a civic-action coordinator to his staff, pressure had to be applied through the Deputy Force Commander's office. A few battalions had already appointed officers to perform this duty; others had not. To have any hope of being effective, the UNTAC CAC would need to have a subordinate staff point of contact in every sector. This requirement was fulfilled before

the end of March.

Appointing a civic-action coordinator for each battalion staff may have been the single most important action in whatever success we subsequently enjoyed. Despite the fact that no funding was available, most civic-action coordinators took their jobs seriously and in many cases conducted limited civic-action projects. They collected donations from their comrades; persuaded people to give their time and energies; supported nongovernmental charitable organizations; organized sporting events with the locals; and provided troop labor to support the refurbishing of hospitals, schools and pagodas.

In attempting to institute and sustain small military-civic-action projects on a shoestring, we requested that each company in a battalion adopt a project in its region or immediate area. This concept was later determined to be very successful. Even without funding, company commanders and their soldiers assisted the local schools, orphanages, hospitals and homes for the handicapped. Homes for the handicapped are important: Cambodia has more amputees per capita than any other country in the world because of the extremely common use of land mines there.

We suggested to senior-sector military observers that individual UNMOs could accomplish much if they were properly motivated, and we recommended that each UNMO team leader adopt a local project. UNMOs performed all kinds of civic action, nearly always without material or financial support: teaching English and French at local schools, supporting nongovernmental charitable organizations, coordinating medical support for remote villages and repairing schools and medical clinics. Because UNTAC could not fund civic action, officers and soldiers alike often donated their own money to support the projects.

One UNMO, Maj. Peter Stiglich, USAF, personally funded and built a playground for Khmer children. Impressed with Stiglich's altruistic drive, local Khmers named the playground "Peter Park" and built a monument there in his honor. The central government later awarded Stiglich the Cambodian "Medal of Reconstruction."

During trips to the provinces, we noted that nearly every sector commander had examined what his battalion might do in civic action if funding were available. Many commanders had good ideas, but no money was available to bring their ideas to fruition.

The lack of money was an issue that had to be addressed. Somehow the CAC had to acquire funding, although fund raising was not a mandated function. In provinces where there were no nongovernmental charitable organizations and no U.N. agencies, the task of conducting civic action would be left to the military. In districts where there were no military units, civic action was provided by U.N. civil personnel, U.N. police, electoral personnel and military observers.

In recognizing the military's innate capabilities, the director of UNICEF allotted $50,000 to the CAC for the military's use in repairing or building as many as 10 primary schools. These schools were located in six provinces where little funds had been spent previously for such projects. Although the projects were managed by sector civic-action coordinators, the local populace, and oftentimes U.N. civil administrative personnel, were involved. Much was accomplished with limited funds by using local labor and materials.

In response to a CAC proposal, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees agreed to provide $100,000 for a joint project between the CAC and a French charitable organization. The funds were to be used to purchase mosquito netting for Khmers living in malarial-infested regions of Cambodia. The French handled distribution, the CAC procurement.

The problem, however, was not only funding, but rather the *kind* of funding. The CAC needed money in the form of discretionary funds for quick-impact projects. We submitted another proposal to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for $50,000 in discretionary funds for the repair of schools, hospitals and orphanages. This request was approved, and the funds were later disbursed to sector civic-action coordinators for projects in the

provinces.

We also strengthened the connection between the U.N. Military Information Office and the CAC. We provided the military information officer copies of our weekly reports to the force commander. In turn, the MILINFO officer planned media coverage of significant civic action, thereby improving UNTAC's public image among the local populace as well as among the world press.

With the establishment of the CAC, support of nongovernmental charitable organizations such as CARE, Action International Contra La Faim and others, was recognized as a priority. These NGOs provided what UNTAC could not: long-term sustainment of projects and programs. They were in Cambodia well before UNTAC's arrival and would remain long after our departure. UNTAC's mandate expired in the fall of 1993.

The CAC-produced pamphlet discussed earlier also outlined military capabilities to support NGO activities. Copies of the pamphlet were distributed throughout the country to every NGO. The results were heartening. Although many NGOs were initially uncertain, the CAC began receiving requests for support within a few weeks. The UNTAC CAC, in turn, sent the requests to sector civic-action coordinators for action.

Sector civic-action coordinators handled NGO requests for support in their own sectors. If a sector's civic-action coordinator was unable to provide the support, the request was forwarded to the UNTAC CAC for consideration. All requests for multiple-province or countrywide support came directly to the UNTAC CAC.

Working with NGOs, UNTAC engineers dug ponds in which the handicapped could raise fish for food; military doctors supported privately funded inoculation programs; commanders provided security and ground transportation to those working in and near Khmer Rouge-controlled areas; and air operations provided limited heliborne and fixed-wing transport into remote areas for personnel as well as NGO medical supplies.

Working together, we accomplished much more than if we had worked separately. At the most basic level, we attempted to match an UNTAC military capability with a stated NGO need. We satisfied an overwhelming majority of the hundreds of requests received.

Workers repair a Cambodian primary school in northwestern Cambodia. Repairs were sponsored by the Dutch Battalion with money acquired from the Dutch government.

Photo by Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Security

We had many discussions with officers from various national contingents in the provinces who viewed civic action in opposition to security issues. They felt that dedicating more soldiers to civic projects meant that fewer would be available for security duties. At every opportunity, we attempted to convince these officers that their best security might be an aggressive civic-action program.

UNTAC units and UNMO teams that conducted civic-minded projects won both respect and admiration from the locals and were often forewarned of impending attacks and recently mined roadways. Cambodians who felt that UNTAC members were their friends acted accordingly and provided U.N. soldiers with information about the movements and dispositions of hostile factions. Such valuable information could not have been secured in any other way.

An unarmed military observer, Maj. Kevin Fossett , USMC, related an incident that occurred in the heavily Khmer Rouge province of Prear Vihear in northern Cambodia. During a vehicular patrol, Fossett

was approached by a friendly Cambodian and warned about an ambush that had been set by the Khmer Rouge less than a kilometer ahead. Fossett heeded the warning and changed his route. He later verified that the Cambodian's story was true. Fossett credited civic action previously performed in the area as key to building rapport with the locals and ultimately saving his life.

The missing-in-action joint task force operating out of Phnom Penh also benefited from the positive relationships between U.S. military personnel and the Khmers. American observers assigned to the U.S. Military Observer Group informally supplied the MIA JTF with reports received from local contacts regarding American servicemen missing from the time of the Vietnam War. Lt. Col. Gene Thompson, a Special Forces U.S. military observer team chief, taught English in his spare time in Kham Pong Cham Province. One of his contacts from the school volunteered information that later assisted in an MIA JTF investigation.

The causal linkage between the local populace's providing valuable information to military members and UNTAC civic-action programs is anecdotal yet convincing. Security and information-gathering were enhanced through civic action.

Recommendations

• Establish a separate civic-action staff function for future peacekeeping missions. The staff should be equal to other staff functions such as logistics, operations and administration. Civic action must be planned prior to and instituted on the first day of a peacekeeping mission.

• Allocate a budget that will support small, quick-impact projects such as the repair of schools and hospitals and the digging of wells. U.N. staff agencies can supervise these projects and provide policy guidance.

• Provide medical support and funding for medicine. Medical support is essential in any peacekeeping area of operations. Funding for medicine is crucial and should be recognized as a separate funding category. Military doctors possess enormous capability for doing good; they should be allowed the opportunity. The World Health Organization and UNICEF could provide policy guidance on issues such as medical protocols governing the treatment of infectious diseases.

Photo by Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Indonesian engineers repair a bridge in Kampong Thom Province. Building and repairing bridges was necessary so that voters could get to the polling booths.

• Increase the size of the medical detachments assigned to contingent battalions. Medical personnel and their commanders will feel compelled to assist the local population, and they should be financially and materially supported. The good will won by medical and all other civic action ultimately serves the mission.

• Increase the number of engineers assigned to contingent battalions, depending upon the mission requirements and the assessed needs. Engineers are essential in building and repair projects.

• Give future force commanders authority over their own budgets. Currently, U.N. career civil servants control all monies in a peacekeeping mission. Had the force commander of UNTAC had the authority, he would have funded civic action, but that power was reserved for budgeteers at U.N. headquarters. The U.N. sometimes tasks commanders with extremely difficult missions, but with no authority over one of their key resources: money.

Conclusion

The argument that U.N. organizations conduct civic-action programs, thereby

negating the need for a military component to conduct similar programs, is not a sound one. The preponderance of the people living in the provinces of Cambodia are unfamiliar with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. Development Programs and the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund. Despite their good works, these organizations are relatively small and low-profile. For most Cambodians, the U.N. was represented by those whom they saw every day near their homes and workplaces: the U.N. soldiers, the electoral officials and the police.

The military is often the largest component in a peacekeeping mission. The vast majority of personnel, trucks, aircraft, engineering assets and medical facilities are military. The UNTAC military component had the capability to accomplish more in a shorter period of time than any other organization in the country.

In Cambodia, military capabilities for civic action far outstripped those of any other component. Yet UNTAC was not mandated to conduct civic action. From U.N. headquarters' perspective, such a proposal would likely have been perceived as infringing on the prerogatives of U.N. staff agencies such as UNHCR, UNDP and UNICEF.

Those prerogatives no doubt appear important from New York's perspective. But in the provinces, the sheer weight of human suffering in and around UNTAC military-component units affected each member deeply. Soldiers in the remotest regions of Cambodia faced Khmer malnutrition and disease daily. Many in the military component wanted to help and did. Yet much more could have been done if funding and staff guidance had been provided from the early days of the U.N. mission in Cambodia.

According to UNTAC's Medical Branch, as of April 1993, military medical personnel had treated 38,355 Cambodians for injury and disease since the beginning of the mission. They did it without funding from U.N. headquarters. The number of Cambodians treated accounted for 26 percent of all the cases seen. Early statistics in May 1993 suggested that the percentage of Cambodians being treated was rising.

The funding that CAC ultimately received came from local UNICEF, UNHCR and other officials who had recognized that financial support for military civic action was money well-spent. Daniel LeBlanc of UNHCR in Phnom Penh stated, "We had no doubt that the military component would follow through on the projects we funded. We also recognized that the military was an enormous, untapped resource for furthering the goals of our organization."

A military civic-action staff should be established in all peacekeeping organizations. Activities must be funded and supervised by the appropriate U.N. staff agencies — in support of the larger goals of the U.N. beyond the peacekeeping mission itself. Perhaps the best way to ensure funding for military civic-action programs is to provide future peacekeeping commanders authority over their own budgets.

The military component of any peacekeeping operation is not a charitable or developmental organization. Conducting military civic action goes to the heart of the peacekeeping mission itself. Civic action is the best means of gaining and maintaining the initiative in winning the hearts and minds of a local populace, improving information gathering and enhancing security. The good will generated as a result of civic action is more than worth the investment in terms of potential lives saved and missions accomplished.

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International Affairs Symposium Examines Regional Problems

by Norvell B. DeAtkine

Many nations face continual challenges as a result of the end of the Cold War. The bipolar world of that era made international life relatively stable and predictable, if not entirely safe and secure. Developing nations were able to ignore their internal problems because they were fully focused on the struggle for national security amidst the private manipulations and the public breast-beating of the great-power pachyderms: the United States and the former Soviet Union. Now, across the globe, nations are forced to face internal challenges and, at the same time, adjust to new and far-less-certain international relationships.

To examine the challenges in five regions of the world (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East), the Regional Studies Course of the Special Warfare Center and School's 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, hosted the Fifth International Affairs Symposium Dec. 2-4, 1993. The RSC is designed to provide Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs officers with fundamental training in duties requiring area studies and political-military analysis.

The theme of the symposium was "The Role of Special Operations Forces in a Changing World Environment." Guest participants were civilian and military subject-matter experts from business, government and academia. Symposium workshops covered each of the five regional areas. Although every region of the world presents significant challenges to U.S. policy-makers, the Middle East remains preeminent. The following summary of the discussions on the Middle Eastern region is an example of the discussions in the other symposium workshops.

The Middle East

The Middle East represents a region that is just beginning to face challenges which have been dormant in recent years. These challenges include the changes in leadership and ideology, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the compatibility of Islam and Western-style democracy.

Over the last five years there have been interesting developments in the Middle East. The demise of the Soviet Union and the coalition success of Operation Desert Storm marked the decline of old transnational ideologies, such as Pan-Arabism and Arab-Socialism, as viable mechanisms for mobilizing the population. In their place, the state has emerged victorious. This poses two profound problems.

First, the concept of statehood is a Western invention that is anathema to Arab unity and an obstacle to Pan-Arabism. Democracy, with capitalism an ancillary requirement for U.S. aid, provides a less-than-perfect alternative to Pan-Arabism. Unfortunately, the lack of Western dialogue inhibits the development of an innovative ideological option. Surprisingly,

vibrant debate is occurring within the Islamic fundamentalist community. Discussions on topics such as the compatibility of Islam and democracy, minority rights, and the role of women in Islamic life may provide legitimacy to Islamic fundamentalism by projecting it as a feasible ideological alternative to Pan-Arabism or democracy.

The second issue, which is not given much attention in media or in print but which has profound implications for stability in the Middle East, is the succession of leadership. The current leadership is either elderly or ailing. Hafiz Al Asad (Syria) and King Hussein (Jordan) are in ill health. King Fahd (Saudi Arabia), Yasir Arafat (Palestine Liberation Organization) and Yitzak Rabin (Israel) are in their advanced years. Their successors lack either a strong personality, popular support, or the intellect to administer a state. Prince Hassan (brother of King Hussein) of Jordan is an example of a potential successor who lacks popular support.

This weaker leadership will assume the reins of power when the need for strong leadership will be more critical than it is today. The end of the Cold War, the significant change in the status quo resulting from Operation Desert Storm, and the unprecedented Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative mark the end of business as usual. Leaders will be less able to use external threats to divert their peoples' attention from internal shortcomings. Now, leaders must address the socioeconomic problems that have plagued their states. High unemployment, poor economic planning, corruption, water shortages and the lack of housing are just a few of the issues that will challenge the new leadership. It is doubtful that they can rise to the occasion to effect reform without the threat of widespread violence.

Their task will be exacerbated by the weakened state of the institutions themselves. Fissures in the Alawi (the ruling religious sect of Syria) unity may lead to loss of power after the departure of Hafiz Al Asad. At one time, Jordan and the monarchy were seen as one. This is no longer true. The absolute power of the monarchy is eroding under the intrusion of democracy. These fragile institutions may be too weak both to tolerate the pressures of change and to control the direction of change, thereby plunging countries into crises. If the leadership fails in an environment where there is a lack of a credible ideology to supplant the failed traditional transnational beliefs, Islamic fundamentalism may ascend to power.

Islamic fundamentalism

It is critical to discuss Islamic fundamentalism in the context of Iran. Iran is involved in a massive modernization of its military. Although most experts agree that Iran's purchases exceed its actual defensive needs, it currently poses little threat to its neighbors and no immediate threat to U.S. interests. The Iran-Iraq War exhausted Iran's will to fight. For the most part, its military hardware is old and poorly maintained. And although the U.S.-sponsored embargo of military spare parts has been effective, Iran may be capable of reconstituting sufficient military power to strive once again for regional dominance.

Iran is still involved in the exportation of a militant, polarized Islamic fundamentalism. For example, Egypt sharply criticizes Iran for promoting Islamic fundamentalism within its borders, but to solely blame Iran for its rise is naive and belies the truth. The real threats are poor socioeconomic conditions and widespread corruption, which exist in many Middle Eastern countries. Poverty is endemic, and government inability to change the conditions is creating a combustible situation.

Egypt is a perfect example.

Islamic fundamentalism has always existed in Egypt. It was born there in the 1920s and re-emerged in the 1960s after the decline of Nasserism. It is growing once again because the indigent socioeconomic conditions have worsened in the last few years. Demographics, especially the increasing population, have strained resources. Massive underemployment, low wages and institutional corruption have created a bloated, ineffective bureaucracy, thus fanning the flames of dissent. Governments such as Egypt's are unable to meet the needs of their people, as demonstrated by their inability to organize humanitarian assistance after natural disasters.

The poor infrastructure is only one root cause of the re-emergence of Islamic fundamentalism. Egyptians, like many Arabs, are disillusioned with their leadership's inability to unite the Arabs, to provide for an egalitarian society as promised in the Koran, and to uphold the moral values of the Islamic community. They are looking for an alternative to the old transnational ideologies that have failed them. In this time of crisis, it is natural for a community to fall back on its basic values.

In recent years, Islamic fundamentalism expanded its appeal to the middle class. The fundamentalists have spoken out against the poor socioeconomic conditions, and they are the only group debating current issues such as the compatibility of Islam and democracy. This process has provided a long-sought legitimacy to Islamic fundamentalists. Since fundamentalism is the only ideology currently in the region that offers hope and a moral standard, Middle Easterners are turning toward it.

Is democracy compatible with Islam? There is little dialogue in the West to help answer this question; however, there are issues to resolve. First, democracy is an evolutionary process. It took more than 200 years for America to achieve its current form of democracy. Most Middle Eastern states have existed for less than 50 years. Most Middle Eastern countries have not advanced their societies to a point where they can adopt our form of democracy. The second issue is capitalism. Although we view it as inherent in the democratic process, it is viewed as amoral among the Islamic leaders of the Middle East. Capitalism does not satisfy the moral needs of the Middle Eastern people. Two countries are seen as test beds for democracy: Yemen and Jordan. It is too early to predict the results of these democratic experiments or the kinds of democracy that may emerge.

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Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom

by Col. Jeffrey B. Jones

Psychological operations did not win the Gulf War, but like brilliant planning, superior technology, massive firepower, logistics and well-trained forces, they played a significant part.

By encouraging coalition solidarity, reducing enemy combat power and deceiving the enemy about allied intentions, PSYOP contributed to the success of coalition operations and saved tens of thousands of lives on both sides. An examination of the war's PSYOP reveals lessons that will assist soldiers and their leaders in planning and conducting future crisis-response operations.

Before the Gulf War, during combat operations, and in the aftermath, approximately 650 soldiers from the 4th Psychological Operations Group and from reserve-component PSYOP units contributed to the coalition efforts. They provided radio and TV support, broadcast tactical loudspeaker messages and produced 29 million leaflets. The leaflets were delivered by everything from balloons to B-52s; some were even smuggled into Baghdad itself! PSYOP messages persuaded approximately 44 percent of the Iraqi army to desert, more than 17,000 to defect, and more than 87,000 to surrender. Integrating their efforts with those of the U.S. Central Command, 21 PSYOP soldiers, working with their Turkish counterparts in Joint Task Force Proven Force in southern Turkey and using radio broadcasts and leaflets, helped cause the defection, desertion and surrender of some 40,000 Iraqis — all without firing a shot. During the critical weeks following the war, PSYOP soldiers assisted the newly liberated Kuwaiti people. Others remained in northern Iraq for six months, supporting coalition humanitarian-assistance operations with the Kurds.

Months before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, specialists from the 4th PSYOP Group were already in the region, working for U.S. defense attachés in Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Djibouti, Yemen and Pakistan; for the United States Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia; and in the Sinai with the Multinational Force and Observers. The cultural, linguistic and military experience these soldiers gained proved invaluable to the overall PSYOP effort in the Gulf.

With the Iraqi invasion, additional PSYOP soldiers deployed to the region with the initial elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, followed shortly by a PSYOP staff officer with the advance party from Special Operations Command, Central Command, or SOCCENT. A team of military and civilian specialists from the 4th PSYOP Group deployed almost immediately to USCENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Fla., to prepare a strategic PSYOP plan. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf approved the plan in late August, and it was forwarded to Washington for intera-

gency implementation. The 4th PSYOP Group also developed a theater PSYOP plan with details down to the tactical level. PSYOP units began predeployment preparations as the scope of the operation evolved.

Mission and objectives

The mission of the PSYOP Task Force was threefold: Phase I demonstrated U.S. resolve, consolidated support, dissuaded regional Iraqi support, deterred hostilities and promoted combined and multinational interoperability. Phase II reinforced U.S. and allied defensive efforts and persuaded Iraq to discontinue hostilities. Phase III supported offensive operations and promoted and maintained local, regional and international understanding and support.

As approved by the commander in chief of USCENTCOM, task-force objectives were to:

- Gain acceptance and support for U.S. operations.
- Intimidate Iraqi forces.
- Encourage Iraqi discord, alienation, malingering, loss of confidence, resistance, desertion and defection.
- Create doubt and fissures in the Iraqi leadership.
- Strengthen the confidence and determination of friendly states to resist aggression.
- Project the U.S. as a credible deterrent and a capable force.

Organization

The PSYOP organization for combat, along with U.S. and coalition forces, evolved into a multitheater, joint and combined effort. Working as an echelons-above-corps element of U.S. Army Forces, Central Command, or USARCENT, the PSYOP Task Force initially consisted of

Organization of PSYOP Task Force in Desert Storm



half the U.S. Air Force's 193rd Special Operations Group (providing two EC-130 Volant Solo aircraft for aerial dissemination) and elements of the 4th PSYOP Group, including the Middle East-oriented 8th PSYOP Battalion, the 9th PSYOP Battalion, a tactical unit supporting the XVIII Airborne Corps and the SOCCENT, and the PSYOP Dissemination Battalion with print and media. In response to the president's decision to double the size of the U.S. force, the PSYOP Task Force expanded with the addition of a tactical battalion to support the VII Corps, tactical elements to support U. S. Marine Forces, (including loudspeaker teams from four reserve-component PSYOP companies), a reserve-component battalion to support enemy-prisoner-of-war operations, a PSYOP element in Turkey with JTF Proven Force, and a liaison element in Cairo. All were in place before the air war began in January 1991. On Feb. 27, a separate task force under the operational control of SOCCENT deployed to Kuwait City to support liberation and consolidation operations.

The PSYOP Task Force received guidance from three levels: the strategic level (Washington and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the National Security Council, and the interagency Public Diplomacy Coordinating Committee), the operational level (senior U.S. and Saudi commanders, Generals Schwarzkopf and Khalid), and the tactical level (ground combat commanders).

Although the commander in chief of USCENTCOM approved the theater PSYOP plan, the interagency-approval process, mandated by DoD Directive 3321.1, was slow, and the PSYOP Task Force did not receive execution authority until December. Months of potential psychological preparation of the battlefield were lost, but once both U.S. and host-nation approval was granted, PSYOP dissemination began almost immediately. Had the Saudis not requested U.S. support to encourage Iraqi desertion and defection, PSYOP might not have been allowed to play an active role in the war at all.

Theater support

Initially, theater PSYOP efforts in support of USCENTCOM were directed toward unifying the disparate elements of the multinational force. The POTF created, developed and produced a regionally oriented videotape, "Nations of the World Take a Stand." Distributed throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia as a product of the United States Information Agency, the videotape presented the coalition as a formidable force unified under a common cause in support of the wishes of the world. Produced in four languages, the tape was played continuously throughout the region. Its effectiveness was heralded throughout the U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense.

PSYOP leaflets had a succession of themes designed to intensify by increments: In late December they were "Peace not war," "Arab brotherhood," "Time is running out," "The world is allied against aggression," and "Saddam has betrayed you." As the United Nations deadline approached, the primary theme became "Coalition technological superiority and the inevitability of defeat."

Once hostilities began on Jan. 17, 1991, the pace of PSYOP support increased greatly, particularly when intelligence sources began reporting the effectiveness of leaflet, loudspeaker and radio campaigns against enemy forces in Kuwait and Iraq. The coalition later opened a sec-

Soldiers of the PSYOP Task Force load a leaflet bomb during Operation Desert Storm.

U.S. Army photo

ond PSYOP front targeted at northern Iraqi cities and military sites. Radio and leaflet operations were staged out of southern Turkey by the U.S. European Command's JTF Proven Force.

Within the overall operational environment, PSYOP support to the unified and component commands took several forms:

• USCENTCOM-approved regional radio broadcasts out of Egypt and Turkey were designed to strengthen U.S. and coalition ties while providing the enemy with factual, current information on the progress of the war.

• A strategic leaflet campaign against Baghdad, air bases deep in Iraq, and Republican Guards units in northern Kuwait and southern Iraq stressed the magnitude of the allied effort, the error of Saddam Hussein's political position and the futility of standing against the strength of the coalition forces.

• Several USCINCCENT-directed leaflet missions designed to degrade the enemy's morale and will to fight resulted in significant numbers of desertions, defections and surrenders before the ground offensive began.

USARCENT support

PSYOP supported USARCENT by enhancing deception operations, by supporting operations with loudspeaker surrender appeals and by broadcasting "Voice of the Gulf" radio programs from two ground stations, Qaysumah and Abu Ali, as well as from the 193rd SOG's Volant Solo aircraft. Sixty-six loudspeaker teams provided direct support, down to division level, across the entire coalition front.

The 8th POTF also provided tactical leaflet dissemination, using 155mm leaflet artillery rounds and F-16 aircraft carrying M-129A1 leaflet bombs. Leaflet operations at this level were designed to support deception and offensive operations. Leaflets overprinted with the VII and XVIII corps logos were dropped along the central Kuwait-Saudi Arabian border. They were so successful in implying that the main U.S. advance would occur inside Kuwait that the USCENTCOM commander canceled subsequent missions because of the significant Iraqi buildup in front of the Arab Corps.

The combination of massive air power and leaflet and loudspeaker operations created a PSYOP environment that produced large numbers of desertions, defections and surrenders, including the capitulation of an entire battalion-sized unit, before the ground campaign began. The pervasive Iraqi belief in coalition supremacy led to massive surrenders throughout the ground campaign. The 8th POTF also provided extensive PSYOP support to the overall theater EPW program. PSYOP elements deployed in theater to pacify and exploit EPWs at both USARCENT EPW camps.

The purpose behind the exploitation program was to interview volunteer Iraqi prisoners and obtain information for loudspeaker and broadcast messages that would be transmitted to their fellow Iraqi soldiers. These appeals contributed to the large number of EPWs taken with little or no hostile fire. Finally, the 8th POTF provided support to Urban Freedom, USSOCCENT's liberation of Kuwait City, and to Task Force Freedom, the USARCENT-directed consolidation operation in Kuwait, with the mission of re-establishing radio and print activities to support repatriation and settlement of the capital.

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Other support

PSYOP support to the Air Force component of Central Command, USCENTAF, occurred primarily during the preparation phase, with the development of a downed

flier "pointy-talky," a multilingual blood chit displaying an American flag and promising a reward to anyone who assisted the bearer. PSYOP forces also made broadcasts to support search-and-rescue operations. These products were not restricted to USCENTAF efforts; they supported all pilots and crews in theater. Initially, the 193rd SOG's Volant Solo aircraft monitored Iraqi radio transmissions and rebroadcast the Voice of America. Once the task force received dissemination approval, these aircraft became the primary aerial conduits for the POTF's "Voice of the Gulf." In the later phases of the war, PSYOP also prepared, developed and executed, on a small scale, a campaign aimed at persuading Iraqi pilots to defect, with their aircraft, to Saudi airspace rather than to Iran.

Despite facing a death penalty for possessing coalition leaflets, a large percentage of Iraqi defectors and EPWs were carrying leaflets when they surrendered. One prisoner was reported to have had 345 leaflets when he arrived at the EPW camp.

PSYOP support to the Marine Corps forces of Central Command, USMARCENT, was similar to that provided to USARCENT. Support consisted of 25 loudspeaker teams, leaflet artillery rounds, M-129A1 leaflet bombs dropped by MARCENT F/A-18 aircraft, and EPW exploitation teams. Marine pilots, like their Army, Air Force and Navy counterparts, were also issued the multilingual blood chits. The Marines were enthusiastic about using tactical PSYOP to support all phases of their operations. Through MARCENT-wide application of PSYOP, the Marines were effective in taking prisoners and influencing enemy action through loudspeaker teams and leaflet drops. PSYOP supported the MARCENT deception plan by disseminating leaflets, floated to the beach in plastic water bottles, designed to convince Iraqis in Kuwait that an amphibious assault was imminent. Intelligence gathered after cessation of hostilities indicated that this campaign was highly successful.

PSYOP efforts to support U.S. Navy Forces, Central Command, or USNAVCENT, were limited to a leaflet drop supporting deception operations and a MARCENT loudspeaker operation on Faylaka Island. As a result of the loudspeaker operation, 1,405 Iraqi soldiers surrendered to a significantly smaller U.S. Marine force without firing a shot.

USSOCCENT PSYOP support during Desert Storm was limited to leaflet dissemination, three loudspeaker teams and tactical leaflet support using deception and intimidation themes. During Urban Freedom, the SOCCENT operation to clear Kuwait City, the 8th POTF was reconstituted with print, media, propaganda-development and loudspeaker assets.

Milestones

During Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom, the PSYOP Task Force met the following milestones:

- 342,000 leaflets disseminated by balloon, waterborne and manpack operations.
- 18.7 million leaflets disseminated by high-altitude MC-130 aircraft.
- 3.3 million leaflets disseminated by F-16 aircraft, spanning 36 missions, using M-129A1 leaflet bombs.
- 2.2 million leaflets disseminated by B-52 aircraft, spanning 20 missions, using M-129A1 leaflet bombs.
- 1.1 million leaflets, public-service posters and handbills disseminated in Kuwait City.
- A videotape, "Nations of the World Take a Stand," was distributed in multiple languages to each regional capital in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Two hundred copies were disseminated in Baghdad.
- An audiotape, "Iraq the Betrayed," designed to foment anti-Saddam sentiment, was broadcast from EC-130 Volant Solos, and copies were also smuggled into Baghdad.
- The radio program "Voice of the

Gulf" broadcast 18 hours a day for 40 days from two ground stations and an aerial platform over Saudi Arabia and from two additional ground stations and a Volant Solo aerial platform over Turkey. A combined Saudi, U.S., Egyptian, Kuwaiti and British propaganda-development cell developed the tapes and scripts. Broadcasting included 3,250 news items, 13 Iraqi EPW interviews, 40 press releases and interviews, and 189 PSYOP messages.

• PSYOP soldiers supported EPW operations at two EPW camps, three corps collection points and numerous divisional collection points.

• Individual and combined loudspeaker operations persuaded thousands of Iraqi soldiers to surrender without friendly forces having to fire a shot or maneuver into harm's way.

Impact indicators

The following indicators attest to the success of PSYOP activities in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom:

• Prior to hostilities, leaflet operations generated extensive Iraqi concern about the penetration of Kuwaiti airspace by U.S./coalition aircraft. In fact, that airspace was never penetrated before hostilities began.

• Iraqi soldiers fired weapons at leaflets falling from the sky.

• The morale of the Kuwaiti citizenry soared once leaflet operations began.

• Iraqi units were repositioned because of deception-leaflet operations.

• The Iraqi III Corps commander's sandtable, found in Kuwait City, depicted virtually all coalition avenues of approach as coming from the sea.

• Despite facing a death penalty for possessing coalition leaflets, a large percentage of Iraqi defectors and EPWs were carrying leaflets when they surrendered. One prisoner was reported to have had 345 leaflets when he arrived at the EPW camp.

• Massive numbers of Iraqis deserted prior to and during the war.

• Iraqi death squads operated between the Iraqi and coalition fronts to stop and assassinate defecting Iraqi soldiers.

U.S. Army photo

A UH-1 helicopter carries loudspeakers used for dissemination of PSYOP messages during Operation Desert Storm.

• Frontline Iraqi troops reported the continual harmful effect of coalition leaflet and radio messages.

• The Iraqis mounted their own leaflet and information campaigns to counter coalition leaflet operations.

• The Iraqi command confiscated its soldiers' personal radios.

• Iraqi sources attempted to jam coalition broadcast operations.

• Iraqi EPWs reported listening to coalition broadcasts for "true" information.

• The Iraqi chain of command reported to its soldiers that coalition leaflets were contaminated by chemical agents.

• Iraqi "Mother of All Battles" broadcasts changed frequencies to counter coalition broadcasts.

• A 500-man battalion surrendered in the XVIII Airborne Corps' sector prior to the start of the ground war. After the ground war began, more than 87,000 Iraqis surrendered, including the 1,405 soldiers on Faylaka Island. Ninety-eight percent of all EPWs either carried or had seen PSYOP leaflets.

• Fifty-eight percent of all EPWs reported hearing the "Voice of the Gulf" and trusted the broadcasts. Eighty percent of those followed the instructions or actions encouraged by the broadcasts.

• Thirty-four percent of all EPWs reported hearing loudspeaker broadcasts,

and more than half of those complied with the surrender messages.

Lessons learned

• Given the success of PSYOP in Panama and in the Gulf, its legitimacy as a force multiplier has improved remarkably. However, there are still those who do not understand its components, its applicability or its potential in peacetime and in war. DoD and interagency education remains a primary requirement to ensure that PSYOP will be used successfully in the future.

• The DoD-approval process for peacetime PSYOP prevented PSYOP activities during the deterrence phase. Deterrence PSYOP can be very effective in preventing or postponing combat operations. A baseline of generic, non-theater-specific PSYOP initiatives must be developed and endorsed by the senior military commander on the scene and by the U.S. ambassador as soon as possible.

• Deployment of PSYOP specialists was delayed during the Gulf War despite the small amount of airlift they require, their high return on investment and the fact that they are the only means of shaping the battlefield during the deterrence phase. Early deployment of PSYOP forces is critical to deterrence and psychological preparation of the battlefield.

• With the exception of the 64 strategic initiatives approved in August 1990 by the commander of USCENTCOM and forwarded to the Joints Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, there is little evidence of strategic PSYOP during either the deterrence or combat phases of the Gulf War. This deficiency was noted by the British Ministry of Defense. Strategic propaganda analysis was performed throughout the conflict by the 8th PSYOP Battalion's civilian Strategic Studies Detachment. The analysis was provided to all components as well as to the U.S. country team.

• The Washington-based Public Diplomacy Coordinating Committee, although initially effective, played little tangible role in the orchestration of international public opinion. This committee should convene routinely, before and during crises, and should play an active role in seeking support from allies and friends.

• Effective, coordinated, combined multitheater PSYOP requires planning, effort, patience, communications and command endorsement. Much can be done in peacetime to increase the probability of success in a crisis or in war.

• Host-nation approval and participation are essential to effective PSYOP in most theaters.

• Liaison with the U.S. country team was critical in achieving expanded conduits in Iraq and Kuwait. From the ambassador, the deputy chief of mission and the U.S. Information Service representatives to the members of the defense attaché office, support for PSYOP could not have been better.

• PSYOP contributed significantly to the success of operational and tactical deception operations.

• Joint PSYOP with the Air Force and the Marine Corps contributed to the success of ground operations. Although understandably reluctant in the beginning to commit aircraft to the PSYOP effort solely for the delivery of leaflet bombs, USCENTAF provided B-52s, F-16s and C-130s, targeting Republican Guards divisions, frontline divisions in Kuwait and Iraq, towns, villages and even Baghdad before the end of the war. Coordination was constant and effective. The commander of USMARCENT became an enthusiastic advocate, committing both personnel and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to the PSYOP effort.

• PSYOP support to EPW operations proved invaluable. Several administrative camp-support requirements, such as processing-station signs, camp rules and EPW handouts, became the responsibility of PSYOP almost by default. Although support could have become a diversion from more time-sensitive tactical requirements, it did not.

• The U.S. Army inventory of 155mm leaflet artillery rounds would have been insufficient for multicorps offensive operations had the war lasted longer. Production of the rounds has since been discontinued. This may be a mistake, even though maneuver warfare makes their

use less likely.

• Loudspeaker operations were instrumental in persuading thousands of Iraqis to surrender. The theater requirement for loudspeakers, however, exhausted the U.S. supply from both the active and reserve components. More loudspeakers are clearly needed.

• Virtually without exception, organic linguist skills proved insufficient for the requirement. Without Arab augmentation, unilateral U.S. PSYOP efforts would have failed.

• Reserve-component PSYOP forces activated for the war performed superbly. The tactical requirements, however, were for loudspeaker and liaison teams, not for headquarters. The only exception to this was the need for a headquarters element from the EPW PSYOP battalion.

• There is no substitute for in-country training. Exercises, long-term TDYs and permanent assignments that placed PSYOP soldiers in the area before the Iraqi invasion proved invaluable.

• During consolidation, PSYOP forces were instrumental in the re-establishment of print and media capabilities in Kuwait. They also contributed to post-occupation humanitarian-assistance operations.

In his recommendation for the 4th PSYOP Group's Meritorious Unit Citation, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf stated that the group conducted the largest and most successful psychological-operations campaign in U.S. military history. During 7 1/2 months in the Gulf, PSYOP accomplished its mission as an effective combat multiplier for an entire unified theater, saving thousands of lives on both sides of the war. There can be no greater contribution.

Col. Jeffrey B. Jones is currently the commander of the 4th PSYOP Group, Fort Bragg, N.C. A 1971 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he has served in a variety of Army, joint and United Nations command and staff assignments. He commanded the 8th PSYOP Battalion during Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama and Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Southwest Asia. Colonel Jones holds a master's degree in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Military Coordination Center:

Forward Component of Provide Comfort

by MSgt. Linda Brandon

DoD photo

(Above) Members of the MCC contingent talk to villagers in northern Iraq during a security patrol. The high-visibility patrols ensure that villagers will have the confidence to rebuild.

(Right) An American UH-60 helicopter sits outside a village in northern Iraq. Helicopters are used to patrol the area.

DoD photo

There is nothing covert or low-key about Operation Provide Comfort's Military Coordination Center in northern Iraq. In fact, its mission is "to see and be seen" by the estimated three and one-half million people living there.

Based in Zahko, just inside the Iraqi border, the MCC is the most forward-deployed military ground component of Operation Provide Comfort.

Military personnel from four countries — Turkey, France, Britain and the U.S. — serve in this coalition force of two dozen members who continuously patrol the towns and villages of northern Iraq. They spend their days talking with local authorities and monitoring resettlement progress, the condition of roads and bridges and the security conditions. They also ensure Iraqi military forces adhere to coalition conditions for humanitarian operations.

A deteriorating economic base and the high unemployment rate make dependence on humanitarian assistance just as crucial as dependence on physical security. Internal sanctions have disrupted fuel supplies, electrical power, medical supplies, and a large part of food supplies to most of northern Iraq.

Relief organizations provide physical comforts with food, clothing and construction materials. The high visibility of MCC patrols provides the psychological comfort that tells the people it's safe to rebuild.

MCC patrols canvass the entire security zone. Some patrols are conducted from the air, using U.S. Army UH-60 helicopters assigned to the MCC's rear headquarters at the Turkish Air Force's Pirinclik Air Base, and operated out of Diyarbakir Air Base. Other patrols are conducted by vehicle, using humvees and landrovers that travel in well-armed convoys. MCC members often find themselves navigating dirt roads, steep hillsides and an occasional dead end. Sometimes, several hours are invested looking for a particular village, only to find that it no longer exists. "Villages that are far from the main roads were easily destroyed by air but are difficult to rebuild," explained Lt. Col. Philippe Engelmann, senior French representative for the MCC. "So the people simply find

other places to live." While the names of the villages and the people change, the stories of poverty, hardship, fear, and aggression are repeated.

On a recent patrol, MCC members stood in a young man's front yard as he related his story through an interpreter. His family, which had made their living raising sheep for market, were forced to abandon their home and most of their belongings and to leave Mosul, Iraq.

Although they'd known eviction was a possibility, they were given no explanation and less than an hour's notice before being forced out by armed government troops. Having nowhere else to go, they took refuge with relatives in a small town inside the security zone, where they now share a small house with two other families. As the young man talked, MCC personnel tried to determine the exact plight of his family and others in the area. The man and his family are just one of many small groups trying to rebuild their lives under the protective umbrella of OPC.

MCC personnel live in a compound that is actually several rented houses which have been transformed into a secure working and living environment. The compound contains office space, living quarters, a central dining area, several TV rooms and a small weight room. Most agree that their accommodations are small but comfortable. "You basically have everything you could want here — except your family," said Sgt. Gareth Jones, Royal Air Force. But the concrete walls, concertina wire and around-the-clock guards are constant reminders of the seriousness of the MCC's role in Operation Provide Comfort.

MSgt. Linda Brandon was a member of the Combined Information Bureau for Operation Provide Comfort. This article was reprinted from Tip of the Sword, *Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.*

DoD photo

(Left) A woman washes clothes in a village in northern Iraq.

(Below) Barriers in the street near the MCC compound give evidence of heightened security.

DoD photo

Threat Weapons and Weapons Technologies: Implications for Army SOF

by Julie M. Merchant

There now appears to be a consensus on the national security outlook for the next decade. Undoubtedly, the post-Cold War international environment presents the United States with security challenges unprecedented in ambiguity, diversity, risk and, particularly for Army special-operations forces, opportunity. For the first time since the 1930s, no single power confronts the U.S. with a clear and present danger. However, the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War in many ways only exacerbate the problems facing the U.S.

For many decades, nearly all of our intelligence analysis was directed toward one country. We understood well the Soviets' strategic doctrine and tactics for conducting offensive and defensive operations and had confident estimates of the capabilities of their weapons. The Cold War environment was also one in which U.S. national security strategy carefully rationed the use of military force to only those conflicts that promoted democracy over communism. The world was a dangerous place, but the superpowers were held in check by the knowledge that each had the capability to destroy the planet.

It is not surprising that the sound of hammers tearing down the Berlin Wall was joined by voices sounding the collective ecstasy of the "new world order." Unfortunately, five years later, reality has proven that the new world order is neither new nor orderly. The old forces of adventurism, nationalism and separatism have reappeared, often with violent and unpredictable consequences. Coupled with this is a new national security strategy, still in its infancy, that allows U.S. military involvement in the complicated scenarios of operations other than war, such as peacemaking operations and nation-building efforts. The implication for Army special operations is clear: We must be continually prepared for a variety of threat forces, many with credible military capabilities due to the explosive proliferation of arms worldwide. Maintaining an awareness of weapons and weapons technologies that ARSOF may face will assist in that preparation.

Any discussion of weapons and weapons technologies must address the subject of proliferation. Proliferation, with its various implications, is the hottest defense topic of the 1990s. However, most discussions on the subject fail to define the problem specifically or to place it in perspective to the overall threat. Relevant points that must be addressed include characterization of the arms-market environment,

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Author's note: This article is a condensed, unclassified version of the Army Special Operations Command briefing "Technical Threats to ARSOF." The information is derived from nonproprietary, noncopyright sources.

recognition that possession does not equal capability, and recognition of information gaps concerning proliferation to nonconventional forces. Avoiding these issues risks creating an 11-foot ghost, called proliferation, similar to the 11-foot Soviet bear created in the 1980s.

The first matter of concern is the characterization of the arms market. A decade ago the international arms market was one of many potential buyers with deep purses, but it had with very few sellers. Today, the situation has reversed. Because of fiscal constraints, arms-producing countries have resorted to massive marketing campaigns to fund research and development. Concurrently, the deep well of funds for purchasing weapons has dwindled, largely because of declining oil prices worldwide. Gone, too, are the large arms grants provided by the former Soviet Union, which aided in the buildup of countries such as Cuba and Syria. Although massive arms deals will be the exception rather than the rule, the flood of weapons on the market will allow any potential aggressor to purchase what he wants, provided he has a large-enough checkbook.

Secondly, the existence of a hostile force with an array of sophisticated weapons does not automatically present an overwhelming danger. The more important issue is whether that force also possesses the ability to fully exploit the technical capabilities of those weapons. Factors that will determine a force's ability to achieve maximum benefit from a given weapon include quality of training, professionalism of the force, ability to assimilate technology, ability to develop tactics and doctrine incorporating a heterogeneous weapons mix, and the ability to sustain and maintain a weapons inventory.

Finally, and especially important to ARSOF, most of the discussion of proliferation today involves only weapons being bought and sold by conventional standing armies. The discussion has yet to turn to perhaps the more important subject of just what is being acquired by insurgents and other paramilitary forces that ARSOF may face in future conflicts. These groups often display an unexpected creativity and flexibility in the use of low-technology weapons, thereby compounding the problems associated with assessing their capabilities.

Army special-operations forces, in the course of being deployed worldwide, may encounter forces armed with various mixes of increasingly sophisticated weaponry. It is impossible to discuss in one article the complete array of weapons that ARSOF may face. Therefore, this discussion will focus on those developments in both weapons and weapons technologies that will have the greatest implications for ARSOF operations now and in the future.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition, or RSTA, continues to be one of the most important combat-support functions on the modern battlefield. Timely, accurate intelligence on the disposition and location of enemy forces is prerequisite to the success of any operation. The current international arms market offers a myriad of systems and technologies that enhance both man- and machine-operational RSTA capabilities. These systems and technologies, which include electro-optical sensors, acoustic/seismic sensors and reconnaissance platforms, are used with varying degrees of success in many regions worldwide.

Many nations are purchasing surveillance and reconnaissance systems primarily for employment in a defensive, early-warning and intelligence- acquisition mode. While the majority of such systems provide a long-range, daylight-surveillance capability, they also enhance soldiers' nighttime fighting abilities. Of all the technological advances occurring in this field, the development and proliferation of electro-optical devices, along with "real time" automated processing of data received from existing sensors, will have the greatest implications for special-operations forces.

U.S. night doctrine and the corresponding reliance on EO sensors such as night-vision devices were widely reported during the conflict in the Gulf and, more recently, in Somalia. EO sensors include infrared

U.S. Army photo

A soldier uses a hand-held infrared surveillance device.

image converters, image intensifiers, thermal imagers and low-light-level televisions. U.S. industrial-manufacturing capabilities in this area are unsurpassed; however, widespread awareness of U.S. capabilities has caused rampant growth in the development and acquisition of vision-enhancement devices worldwide. The proliferation of these systems has obvious implications for operations conducted under the cloak of darkness. Integrating EO technology with weapons such as man-portable surface-to-air missiles will mean that concealment of darkness can no longer be assured for SOF aviation units.

The first generation of EO devices came in the form of infrared image convertors fielded by Germany during the last years of World War II. Still in use, these systems employ infrared illumination devices, such as searchlights, with the visible light filtered out. With a target-recognition range of about 1.5 km, infrared night-vision devices allow troops to operate at night without being seen, unless the opposing force has similar systems. Infrared convertors are still being installed on eastern European and Asian vehicles despite their obsolescence in the West, and the potential for their removal and subsequent use as independent systems is great.

Image intensifiers represent the next level of EO sensor development. These systems, incorporating increasingly sensitive photo-cathode material that allows them to operate with natural nighttime ambient light, were introduced into military inventories in the 1960s. Successive generations of systems have produced intensifiers with increased sensitivities, higher resolutions and longer battery life.

U.S. industry is currently enhancing the production of third-generation devices and leads the way in the development and production of fourth-generation image-intensifier devices. While manufacturers espouse the benefits of third-generation devices (three times the sensitivity, twice the image resolution, and about three times the battery life of second-generation systems), few have reached the international arms market. Second-generation systems will be widely sought by forces which need a reliable night-operation capability. Third-generation systems most likely will be available only to countries or organizations willing to spend larger amounts of money for the increased capabilities.

The development of image-intensifier devices was followed by the development of thermal-imaging systems, which require no illumination and operate on thermal emissions from objects in the field of view. Different target aspects may be revealed by the system's ability to move the polarity of the image between white/hot to black/hot. Another advantage of thermal-imaging systems is that they may be used during daytime operations to "see" through external camouflage and battlefield smoke, thereby revealing potential targets. First-generation TI systems are available worldwide and will be used increasingly throughout the remainder of the century. Future generations of these devices, including man-portable systems, will escalate in importance as manufacturing capabilities spread and systems become available on the international market.

Finally, low-light-level television devices integrate image-intensifier systems and TV systems, resulting in an image display or processing at low ambient-light levels.

Coupling a second- or third-generation image-intensifier tube to a TV camera — technology that can be acquired at an electronics shop — produces a solid-state, rugged, low-light-level TV camera. LLLTV systems are being incorporated into other military systems, such as vehicles and weapons, as less expensive alternatives to thermal-imaging devices. Because of their low cost, LLLTVs are affordable systems for forces that can purchase off-the-shelf equipment and modify it for military use.

Automation of resources supporting RSTA is an additional area in which the return on investments will be great. Forces with insufficient automated-data-processing capabilities will not be able to perform real-time processing of the data received by the myriad of RSTA sensors and platforms already built and fielded. To this end, military organizations may invest varying amounts of money to achieve equitable capabilities, depending on the range of their operations. Small paramilitary forces may integrate laptop computers with existing sensors to improve perimeter security, while nations recognizing the importance of the knowledge-based battlefield may establish powerful and expensive automated-data-processing resources to reap the benefits of expensive RSTA sensors and systems across the battlefield.

Electronic warfare

Effective radio communications are a fundamental requirement for mobile operations, yet they can easily become the target of electronic-warfare measures such as jamming, geolocation and interception. EW contributes to the disruption of command and control at decisive points and is a key element on the battlefield. Although EW techniques may be used on all types of electronic systems, of major concern to ARSOF are the technologies that aim to intercept, geolocate or jam communications; and the use of EW against ARSOF information systems.

The extent to which EW systems have been manufactured and fielded has been well-established by open-source publications. A review of these sources reveals that a variety of systems covering the entire electromagnetic frequency spectrum is available worldwide. Ranging from sophisticated airborne platforms to simple, remotely delivered ground systems, these systems will enable hostile forces to use a variety of communication-jamming techniques and to locate and intercept signals. For most forces, the advancements in these systems and their proliferation lessen the challenge of countering unencrypted narrow-band communications. As communications begin to use modern modulation schemes such as direct sequence, frequency hopping or hybrid spreading, EW equipment designed to counter these modulations will emerge. Spaced-based communications are also likely to be increasingly targeted as forces worldwide begin to rely more heavily on satellites as relays.

The capabilities to engage in EW may vary greatly. While the latest technology is available on the open market, forces that have not invested heavily in sophisticated systems may not be able to cover the entire frequency spectrum using automatically tuned systems. To communicate without interference or detection, ARSOF must understand the EW systems available to the opposing force.

Computers, computer systems and automated networks are pervasive in the Department of Defense. Critical to the support of ARSOF operations across the tactical, strategic and sustaining-base environments, these systems make attractive targets. The threat is genuine and is growing. Potential adversaries are individuals or groups, both foreign and domestic, who have the capability and the intent to exploit a system. Their motives include military, political or industrial gain as well as personal amusement.

Adversaries have three primary objectives: the compromise of information, the corruption of data and the disruption of operations. To achieve their objectives, they may use an individual equipped with a personal computer, modem and telephone line; or they may use multiple actors and governmental support. The likelihood of a given threat varies depending on whether the information system is

deployed in the tactical, strategic or sustaining-base environment.

A case demonstrating the threat to information systems is that of the Hannover Hackers. From the mid- to late 1980s, a group of German computer hackers from West Berlin and Hannover used the German telephone network to enter computers at the universities of Karlsruhe and Bremen. From there they connected to international telephone networks and gained access to computers in the U.S., Canada, Japan and western Europe. According to some reports, the hackers were successful in more than 40 percent of their remote log-in attempts. To enter the systems they relied on purchased, stolen or copied passwords, the testing of likely passwords, and the random generation of passwords. Upon log-in, the hackers granted themselves privileges and then installed a Trojan horse that allowed them to record authorized passwords from unknowing users.

Mines

A rapid evolution has taken place in mine technology over the last two decades, and an increased emphasis on mine warfare throughout the world has created an expanding market for all types of mine systems. Their low cost, indefinite shelf life and manpower savings explain their wide appeal. Land and naval mines are now essential weapons in conflicts at all levels: from grass-roots insurgencies to major confrontations between well-equipped armies. Effective mine warfare obstructs the mobility of opposing forces and creates favorable conditions for the

Countries With Significant Landmine Incidents



Honduras	Botswana	Western Sahara	Iraq	India
Nicaragua	Namibia	Morocco	Iran	Burma
Costa Rica	Angola	Libya	The Yemens	Thailand
Colombia	Former Yugoslavia	Egypt	Somalia	Cambodia
Falkland Islands	Sudan	Turkey	Mozambique	Vietnam
South Africa	Chad	Ethiopia	Zimbabwe	New Guinea

mine employer.

Modern mines were first used on the battlefield near the end of World War I in response to the emergence of the tank. Mines evolved into a serious threat during World War II when conventional anti-tank mines and anti-personnel fragmentation mines were widely used. Today, an estimated 85-100 million anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines may lie unexploded in more than 60 nations. Countries with the highest density of mine employment include Afghanistan, Angola, Somalia and Cambodia, where civil-war combatants used the explosive devices to terrorize civilian populations. Mines pose problems long after conflicts; they can be a definite deterrent to light industry, agriculture, repatriation of refugees and overall nation-building processes in which ARSOF may be involved.

Evolving technology is making mines more deadly, more disruptive and more economical. Developments in areas such as remote delivery, detectability, blast-resistant fusing, multiple sensors and "smart" systems have boosted the effectiveness of current systems. They have also simplified laying of the fields and have lowered logistical burdens. The percentage of advanced-technology mines is increasing; and even though new technology is costly, mines are still affordable weapons for any military organization.

The surge of technological sophistication in mines presents keen challenges to the U.S. countermine-development program. Foreign mines are developed with a fair understanding of countermine concepts and are designed to counter detection, identification, removal, neutralization and predetonation. Developmental lead time for mines is much shorter than for countermine programs. Any country can purchase mines to counter specific countermine capabilities or developments.

Air defense

Desert Storm demonstrated the role that air forces can play in preparing the way for ground attacks. Recognizing the importance of air assets, threat forces will seek the most effective weapons to deny air superiority, whether on a limited scale, as in Somalia, or on a greater scale, as in major regional conflicts. Currently, surface-to-air missile systems are the foremost choice.

Surface-to-air missiles can be divided into two categories: those that use radio-frequencies to guide and track the missile through flight, and those that use infrared guidance to target thermal emissions of aircraft. Infrared systems are usually man-portable. Over the last several years, an incredible amount of information has surfaced on surface-to-air systems engineered and manufactured by countries around the world, especially systems offered for sale by Russia. The capabilities of these systems, spanning tactical and strategic ranges, have been widely advertised at trade shows, which indicates their availability on the arms market. Prices range from several million dollars for sophisticated RF systems to several thousand for infrared systems.

U.S. Army photo

A soldier practices the use of an SA-7 surface-to-air missile.

The publicized effectiveness of the Stinger in Afghanistan and both the SA-7 and the SA-14 in El Salvador, along with their relatively low cost, has caused man-portable systems to be widely sought. Because of their ease of employment, these systems have the potential to disrupt ARSOF missions. Originally, visual

target acquisition made man-portable systems nearly ineffective at night. As previously mentioned, however, their combination with night-vision devices could give threat forces a credible nighttime air-defense capability.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have existed since the 1930s and have been used in combat by many nations. Although they have been widely used by Israel during the last two decades, it was not until Desert Storm that the full value of UAVs as inexpensive airborne platforms was realized. Most UAVs now in development use strap-on payloads and are intended for multimission purposes. This feature provides an inexpensive and flexible capability for reconnaissance, communications, electronic warfare or direct attack. The cost of a typical multimission UAV, including payloads, is 0.1 to 1 percent of the cost of a typical manned aircraft and thus may be affordable for even the smallest of potential adversaries, especially those who choose off-the-shelf systems and modify them for a specific use.

Directed energy

Conventional small-arms technology is rapidly nearing its limit worldwide. Weapons will reach their limits of precision within 10-15 years. As industry looks to the future, it will probably pursue technologies using "energy bullets" fired from directed-energy weapons.

Directed-energy weapons, including lasers, radio-frequency weapons and particle-beam weapons, have several advantages over more conventional weapons systems. One advantage is their nearly instantaneous flight to target. Thus, the potential for retargeting is considerable, allowing for the engagement of a multitude of targets over a wide field of view. Targets can also be engaged at reduced ranges, where the probability of target hard kill is increased. A disadvantage of DEWs is weapon performance may be hindered by inclement weather.

The most likely developments of the next decade will be in laser technologies. Increasingly prevalent on the modern battlefield, lasers are used in range determination, target designation, target guidance and communication. Long postulated as a means of surpassing the sophisticated weapons of the modern battlefield, laser weapons have shed their futuristic image and are now a modern reality.

Laser weapons can be divided into two

U.S. Army photo

A soldier wears a Soviet-made protective suit against nuclear, biological and chemical hazards. The NBC threat is likely to continue as nations export their stocks to other countries.

categories: low-energy and high-energy. Low-energy laser weapons attack the sensors on military equipment and the eyes of personnel. Their application produces a "soft kill," which eliminates or interferes with only a specialized function of the target, such as sight. High-energy laser weapons can attack the same range of targets, producing soft-kills at greater ranges or "hard kills," which structurally damage the targets.

Any country or organization with a modest engineering capability can adapt certain commercially available lasers for use in a limited role as blinding weapons. Current Western export controls are not sufficient to control the proliferation of weapon-quality lasers. Countries outside Western export control may also be eager to sell laser equipment. The increasing availability of laser hardware and new technology make the development of "low technology" weapons a real possibility.

Weapons of mass destruction include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. In the last several years, the international community has expressed growing concern regarding these weapons. WMD in the hands of hostile forces threaten not only U.S. lives but also the viability of our regional power-projection strategy. Attempts to control the export of these weapons and their associated technologies have been unsuccessful, and proliferation is likely to continue until we can enforce export controls. Until then, ARSOF must be prepared to operate, survive and accomplish their missions in nuclear, biological and chemical environments.

No single dominating threat, such as the former Soviet Union, will be the undisputed focus of U.S. security policy during the next decade. Many smaller powers (Third World countries as well as paramilitary forces) are acquiring increasingly powerful and diverse military capabilities, thereby narrowing the technology gap that now favors the U.S. Regional powers will continue their military buildup as a result of transfers of high-technology hardware from major arms exporters and an expansion of indigenous production capabilities.

Besides the products of the major exporters — the U.S., Russia, China and certain European countries — those of other countries such as Argentina, Brazil, North Korea, Pakistan and South Africa will add to market supplies. Overall, continuing improvements in weapons systems and military capabilities and the availability of these improvements to any hostile force will increasingly threaten ARSOF's ability to enter an area either overtly or clandestinely, sustain long-term operations, accomplish specific missions, report information and intelligence to higher authorities and extract forces without discovery.

Julie M. Merchant currently serves as the scientific and technical intelligence analyst in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Prior to this assignment, she served as a threat analyst for the U.S. Army Missile Command, Huntsville, Ala., and as the special-projects officer with the U.S. Army Support Group-Forward in Saudi Arabia. She is a graduate of the State University of New York at Oneonta and is currently completing a master's degree in engineering from the University of Alabama at Huntsville.

Innovative Means of Achieving Innovative Technology

by Rand Ellis

For U.S. special-operations forces to be the best in the world, each of its parts must be effective. The accumulation of many advantages produces the edge that decides mission success.

Even the best-trained personnel can't perform effectively without the best equipment. The best technology occurs through the relentless pursuit of innovation. In these times of tight budgets, the pursuit of innovation calls for innovative perspectives.

The traditional breadth, diversity and global spread of SOF missions have always called for an above-average degree of technological innovation. This is a need that will not change as we enter the 21st century. The accelerating global spread of industrial, business and consumer technologies with war-fighting applications will increase the need for SOF to retain a competitive edge, in environments where we operate without a home-team advantage.

In his 1986 book, *Innovation — The Attacker's Advantage*, Richard Foster described the virtual necessity of maintaining innovative business forces both for the survival and for the prosperity of corporations. Innovations are of benefit not only to users but also for the suppliers providing them.

For many decades the United States maintained a high degree of innovation funding through money spent on defense. Like the ripples created when a stone strikes the surface of a pond, waves of innovative technology eventually spread across our industrial, business and consumer sectors. Some of our global competitors, with Japan being the most prominent, did not follow our route, but instead directly funded primary research in other sectors, such as consumer products. They then spread the resulting innovations to business, industry and defense products. It is clear that both approaches are successful, with time being a decisive factor.

Recent changes in domestic economic priorities and global politics have combined to increase the needs for SOF while budgets are tight. To maintain the fastest possible pace of innovation, we must seek new means. In a war-fighting environment, if the opposing force uses different tactics that work, it can be advantageous to add some of these tactics to our own doctrine to gain superior capabilities.

In adding to established doctrine, a critical aspect is understanding the nature of that doctrine. Change can bring strength, but it can also bring surprises. No one likes surprises — unless they are good ones!

Innovation created America, has made it great and will bring it continued strength in the future. Yet even here in America, our history shows that innovative technology can encounter obstacles. When Alexander Graham Bell first invented the telephone, he was not met with

cheers. At that time, the telegraph-dominated world viewed the telephone as a worthless device! Fifteen years ago, as Apple was creating the personal computer, the significant majority of experts in the computer industry felt strongly that the mainframe was the sole means of dealing with data. Because they didn't appreciate the entire nature of the problem, they delayed a major solution.

To be effective in our pursuit of innovative solutions to problems, we must clearly understand the fundamental nature of the problem. The tools we use today frequently represent the culmination of many small steps in a direction of development, often established over many years. These steps create an inertia that can trap us when an innovative solution approaches from another direction. We become blinded by the assumptions we have accumulated over time. The inventor's clarity of vision often comes from eyes not blinded by assumptions of the past. Like inventors, the generals who have commanded great victories have often seen circumstances not as the majority of others have, but as they truly were.

In the past few years, the term "dual-use technology" has become the defense buzz phrase. It is a phrase based in the compromise between needs and funding. It can mean much more.

Effective dual-use technology does not mean using off-the-shelf industrial, business or consumer technologies in war-fighting roles so much as it means taking the essence of those innovations and combining them with traditional defense technology. In our search for innovative solutions to problems, no stone can be left unturned. Today we must look for better ways and means from military, industrial, business and consumer sources. A great deal of innovation can be achieved through combining and repackaging technologies.

A close partnership between SOF war fighters and SOF suppliers can produce benefits for all team members. When research provides a breakthrough in SOF technology, that research must be quickly leveraged into advances for domestic and international industrial, business and consumer products. This tends to go against the views and the practices of the past as well as our instinctive desire to keep our advantages close to home. However, a key lesson of the past decade is that our global competitors will quickly jump on any opportunity that we delay action on. While we must be concerned with the dangers of a hollow armed forces, we must be equally concerned with the dangers of a hollow economy. Both are equally threatening, and no simple solution exists for either problem.

What SOF suppliers can contribute today is their ability to deal more with creators of innovative technology from nondefense sources and to turn the essence of these innovations into valuable SOF assets. As we fund SOF technological research, achieve new technologies, deploy these technologies in SOF environments and spin them out to broader applications, we can also take advantage of the research funding of other sectors and the flow of technology from the opposite direction. If we look at the way SOF has operated over the past decade, we will see that this has already been taking place to a moderate degree.

Like inventors, the generals who have commanded great victories have often seen circumstances not as the majority of others have, but as they truly were.

What is really important, as we prepare for an increase in SOF roles in the 21st century, is to make sure that the "special" in special operations remains prominent and that conventional military and defense industry ways and means do not dominate and strangle SOF.

A key advantage of the industrial support for SOF lies in the unique breadth of the window that SOF provides both at the domestic level — to the rest of the U.S. armed forces — and at the international level — to allied SOF and conventional forces. The diversity of SOF missions can also help open the doors for commercial

opportunities here in the United States and around the world.

Ultimately, leadership is neither granted nor assumed; it is earned. For America and SOF, leadership is earned by fielding the best personnel and equipment that we can. This leadership is maintained through the determined and continuous quest for innovation in both tactics and technology. With regard to SOF equipment, innovation must be applied to all aspects of SOF technology, from the big-ticket items, such as aircraft, all the way down to the laces for boots. This balance is critical. In planning for the next battle, we must draw our lessons not only from Desert Storm but also from the broad historical perspectives of Somalia, Kuwait, Panama, Grenada, Beirut, Vietnam, Korea and World War II.

People around the world instinctively look to leaders for solutions to their problems. The example set by our special-operations personnel around the world can contribute positively to our success in the international community. The partnership between SOF and SOF suppliers is of greater impact than defense budgets alone can reveal.

As uncertain as circumstances may appear today, one thing is assured: SOF will continue its role as a leading innovator and will continue to challenge SOF suppliers to provide the best possible technology. It is the basic nature of people to thrive whenever they are challenged. Greatness is often achieved when we rise to meet a difficult challenge. We can look forward to a number of new challenges in the 21st century. With innovation, our continued success is not only possible, it is assured.

Rand Ellis wore a green beret in 1969 while he was assigned to the Recon Section of the Royal Canadian Regiment's Third Battalion. From 1970 to 1978, his Canadian Forces assignments included four years as a combat radio technician with No. 1 Combat Group, a tour of duty with the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus, and four years of instructor duty at the Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics Engineering. As a civilian, his work focuses on personal portable communications technology applications in industrial, police and fire-service hazardous operations. He has qualified in winter and mountain warfare, and as a skiing instructor and scuba diver.

Officer Skills: From Technical and Tactical to a Sense of Humor

by Col. Mike Burns

A recent survey of Army general officers conducted by the Army War College to assist in its curriculum development included the following question: "What skills/knowledge do you feel senior officers will need in the next 5-15 years?"

The general officers identified specific skills in nine broad areas. Most of these skills are already taught or cultivated in the Army, but they can be developed only over a period of time.

This sample of the survey results provides a list of traits that officers should possess, and it may also help in identifying the large number of underlying real and necessary skills that will be required of senior officers over the next several years. Although it is important that every officer survey the "skill requirements" of a career in the Army, it seems especially important for foreign-area officers, who often must maintain proficiency in two widely different specialties.

Technical and tactical skills

• First and foremost are the traditional skills of the military profession. All other prerequisites for success assume technical and tactical proficiency in an Army specialty.

• Technical military competence of leaders is the key to achieving combat readiness in their units, but even this is not sufficient. Leaders who possess technical skills will have to be innovative and aggressive in meeting individual and unit standards of competence in ways that they have not been called upon to do in the past. They must be able to turn ideas into action. They must also be contributors of knowledge, creators of solutions and well-reasoned risk takers of an almost entrepreneurial nature.

• All officers must establish a solid foundation in ground warfare and an in-depth understanding of the use of military force. Over the years, officers must develop these skills into an understanding of strategy and the operational art of warfare.

Joint and coalition skills

• Multiservice and multinational skills must become second nature. The Army will seldom operate outside the joint (multiservice) environment. Army officers' long-standing appreciation of joint operations must, in the future, include skills in thinking and operating jointly and the ability to think beyond parochial Army interests.

• The possibilities of conducting operations in a combined (multinational) environment are also high, with the greatest likelihood being ground operations. Operations such as peace enforcement, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance

will very likely characterize the force commitments to a regional conflict.

Resource-management skills

• Officers must acquire a comprehensive understanding of how the Army runs and operates, not just a casual glimpse of what one is exposed to over time. Officers must also develop the skills to manage resources, and they must be able to make difficult decisions about resource allocations.

• As managers of resources, officers must listen to competing priorities, strategies and policies and learn how to achieve effective results while compromising means but not standards.

• Finally, officers must develop better methods of root-cause analysis, problem-solving and process management.

Automation skills

• Officers must be proficient in the use of computers and simulations and have an in-depth knowledge of automation, its uses and applications to management, training, warfare and combat support.

• Officers who employ weapons systems must achieve complete familiarity with automation and information systems as they apply to both training and fighting with sophisticated weapons.

• Officers must be on the leading edge of simulations in training and be able, at all levels, to integrate tactical field training with simulations.

• To ensure combat readiness, officers must be able to assess the level of warfighting skills gained through simulations and the level to be achieved through tactical training.

Communicating, negotiating skills

• Officers must develop the ability to present their case skillfully, analytically, correctly and simply. “Ability” equals public-speaking skills. “Simply” equals charts.

• Officers must understand the roles played by those in public relations and legislative affairs and develop an appreciation for the immediate impact that the news media can have, especially television.

• Officers must also be able to function in a controversial environment and to work controversial issues to an acceptable conclusion. To accomplish this, officers must have the political and diplomatic skills to articulate requirements when resources are scarce, the ability to develop crisp, irrefutable logic to press the case and, finally, an understanding of how to create win-win situations through negotiation and compromise.

Internationalist skills

• With a regionally oriented national strategy, officers must be aware of both the national and international political environments and strive to gain a better understanding of history and the long-standing tensions now coming to the forefront in each region.

• Political-military skills will assume even greater importance and will require an understanding of the culture and history in areas considered to be the most likely for conflict. And while there is a reduced emphasis on Russian capabilities, officers must gain a broad understanding of the regional dangers and the potential for conflict in the Pacific, Southwest Asia, Middle East, Europe and Latin America.

• Officers should develop at least one foreign-language skill.

• Over the years, an officer must gain a cultural understanding of the Third World.

People skills

• Officers must continue to develop the ability to lead and direct ever-larger organizations while also caring for people.

• Officers must be able to listen to other views and opinions and to respect other cultures when making decisions.

• Officers must be able to deal with people on a personal basis, maintain their loyalty and avoid creating animosities.

• There is no substitute for competence and leadership, but if you don’t understand people in the Army, you are in the wrong profession.

Family and social needs

• In an increasingly married Army, officers must understand the social and fami-

ly needs of the soldier who has a spouse and family, the two-soldier family and the single-parent soldier.

• Officers must also have an understanding of the breakup of the "traditional" American family and its relationship to the troops they lead.

• Officers must strive to understand the community and the social needs of the country and to stay attuned to a domestic environment with significant social problems and inequities.

Personal character and vision

• In the challenging environment of the future, officers will require strong personal character — notably, integrity, ethics and courage. With limited resources, keeping standards and quality at a high level may lead to hard choices. Officers must have the integrity to stand up and say "can't do" when the pressure to draw down and cut corners builds. It will take strong convictions to maintain quality of forces.

• Officers must be able to articulate their vision of the future and remain firm in the face of adversity or when challenged about their integrity and ethics.

• Officers must develop the cognitive skills to think strategically, conceptually and analytically; i.e., the ability to think clearly about complicated issues and to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty.

• Officers must learn to set direction while dealing with uncertainty and change. They must not be afraid to think "outside the box" or to explore all opportunities, whether they are economic, technological or political.

• Officers must develop exceptional problem-solving skills and organizational skills because they will be asked to resolve far-reaching and complex issues for which there are no best answers.

• Finally, officers must be able to deal with more stress. They must remain flexible, be highly communicative, be able to deal with and develop new concepts, be sensitive to subordinates' requirements, be able to take on much more responsibility and, all the while, maintain a sense of humor.

Col. Mike Burns is currently in preparation for assignment as the Army attaché to Athens. His most recent assignment was as a planner in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. This article was adapted from the survey titled, "U.S. Army War College 2000: Army Senior Officer Education," August 1992, and the verbatim general-officer comments in response to the question indicated. The author has taken liberty to combine and group the comments of the survey respondents and to add personal observations in order to make the responses readable and consistent.

Interview:

Retired Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough

Retired Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough is a 1936 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. In 1940 he formed America's first parachute battalion as a company commander, subsequently becoming test officer and S-2 for the Provisional Parachute Group and later the Airborne Command. During World War II he participated in seven major campaigns, including America's first use of paratroops in North Africa, the Sicily invasion, ground combat at Anzio as part of Darby's Rangers and the airborne assault into Southern France. In the late 1950s he served as deputy chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group to Cambodia and later as commander of the 66th Counterintelligence Corps Group in Germany. From 1961 to 1965, he served as commander of Fort Bragg's JFK Center for Special Warfare. In later assignments he served as senior member of the U.N. Military Armistice Commission-Korea, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board, as an Army corps commander in Korea, and as chief of staff and deputy commander in chief of U.S. Army-Pacific. He retired from the Army in 1971 and is a writer, lecturer and research consultant.

SW: *When you were commander of the JFK Center for Special Warfare, the Army was preparing for a new type of warfare, counterinsurgency. What were the main difficulties involved?*

Yarborough: The new command into which I moved would be called upon to think beyond the relatively simple concepts of behind-the-lines sabotage and guerrilla raids, and to address a new dimension described by the term "subterranean warfare." The perception that "subterranean warfare" was a massive strategic threat to the Free World came from President John F. Kennedy. Familiar with the irregular-warfare doctrine of Mao Tse Tung, the president insisted that the armed services prepare to cope with the new form of aggression. Thus the term "counterinsurgency" was born and, with it, the presidential mandate to build an elite force that could translate theory into action. Fortunately, Special Forces was the military anomaly around which the kind of instrument the president had in mind could be crafted. Without sacrificing their technical capability to conduct guerrilla operations, they would now be called upon to teach others how to defeat guerrillas and the shadowy mechanisms which spawn and sustain them. Inasmuch as subversion in any sovereign state is a very private and touchy matter, access to the mechanisms which produce it is especially difficult for outsiders. Thus, to be of significant

assistance to a foreign state afflicted with insurgency, Americans charged with the task would have to develop more than a skin-deep rapport with the indigenous people involved. In view of the sensitive political and psychological environment, judgment, maturity, self-discipline and the ability to work harmoniously with a variety of ethnic groups would be all-important qualities in determining an individual's suitability for the extraordinary missions he would be called upon to perform. Contrary to the beliefs of some of our most respected military leaders at that time, conventional forces could not provide anything remotely appropriate for addressing these politically charged quasi-military problems.

In order to meet the rising demand for Special Forces, two substantial problems had to be solved. The pre-1961 Special Forces training programs had to be reworked to include the vast areas embraced by the concepts of counterinsurgency, and the training base had to be expanded drastically to accommodate the increase in Special Forces' strength.

In bringing the formerly, almost exclusively guerrilla warfare-oriented training programs of Special Forces into harmony with the concept of counterinsurgency, we sought help from many sources including the British, whose triumph in Malaya pointed the way toward sound and workable doctrine. The French defeat in Indochina indicated no less eloquently the direction our own efforts should take if we were to benefit from their excruciating experience. In addition to the works of Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara and Vo Nguyen Giap, our instructors and students at the Special Warfare School used, almost as a textbook, *Street Without Joy*, the history of the French war in Indochina by the French author-soldier, Bernard Fall.

The seemingly impossible goal of raising the output of Special Forces without lowering their quality had been made more attainable because of the groundwork laid by my predecessor, then-Col. George M. Jones. By persistent and persuasive representation to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the U.S. Army, he had succeeded in getting authorization to take high-quality NCOs and NCO material from other Army units. This was particularly obnoxious to the commanders of those units, but it meant that the attrition rate in Special Forces training and selection could be held down and that the caliber of Green Beret advisers in contact with foreign military and security forces would be of the highest order.

SW: *Are there special-operations concerns that we should keep in mind as we prepare for operations other than war?*

Yarborough: Yes, there are a great many. Among other considerations, operations that might seem logical from a purely military point of view may not be acceptable either to Congress or to the majority of the American people. We ought to look pragmatically at the special-ops possibilities around the world, to determine what is feasible from an American psychological and political point of view. Certain things are ruled out because of popular opinion. An overly emotional or idealistic perception of our obligation to address many of the world's ills must be tempered by the hard fact that some solutions are beyond our capabilities. Moreover, our bombs, bullets and bayonets may be our most immediately deployable reaction, but they could also be the least effective in confronting a multitude of challenges to our national interests worldwide.

One of my concerns is that Special Forces, which should be the Ph.D.s of the special-ops philosophy, may have gradually been conventionalized to such a degree that the Ranger skills and the Ranger philosophy have sometimes intruded into the Special Forces area in a way that violates the principle of economy of force. With the airborne and the Ranger organizations, I think there's enough potential for doing all the things that have to do with fire and movement. This means long-range reconnaissance, and it means the kinds of things that have to do with demolitions and target hunting behind the lines. The only proviso I'd make is that if long-range reconnaissance requires working with indigenous forces, then Rangers might not be the people to do it. They probably would not be language-trained or area-trained to the degree that would enable them to empathize with the people. I feel that the highly honed language- and area-trained individual should be kept for jobs that require that kind of sensitivity. There should be an emphasis and a premium on that kind of development. This is not to say that a Special Forces guy should not have all the skills that he has. But I've always felt that the TOEs should be flexible enough so that if a man cannot carry a rucksack 500 miles but has tremendous knowledge of the history of a country and of the mores and the culture and has the personality that allows him to be accepted by the leadership in the country, we ought to be able to say to hell with the TOEs. There is a requirement to look at the future and to look at some of the cases where we haven't been able to cope and to see whether this extraordinary military phenomenon can be warped into position where it can handle those things. We have an example right now — Haiti. If there were an instrument for doing anything there, it would be Special Forces: people who speak the language, who understand the culture, who would not throw their weight

around, but who would quietly and persistently preach the gospel that the United States wants them to, recognizing that the differences between the cultures might prevent the Haitians from completely accepting our formulas.

Another concern of mine is PSYOP — it was also one of Bill Donovan's primary concerns. PSYOP continues to be an area in which the United States, because of its peculiar idea about the sanctity of an individual's opinions, has one hell of a time adopting a national position on a psychological theme. The military has the mechanics for PSYOP: We know how to print, we know how to scatter leaflets, and we know how to care for the people who are doing these things. But the intelligence that must go into a PSYOP campaign never is the complete premise of the military. There should be a mechanism for tapping the whole spectrum of the intellectual world — social scientists, historians and psychologists. And that mechanism ought to be nationally understood and controlled, and when the military goes into action, it should have the benefit of those things. We have yet to bring the massive power of PSYOP to bear on our national crisis with regard to drug usage. The determination of the American people to fight and win World War II was aided and nurtured by all of the persuasive power that propaganda could generate. The skills of the psychological warriors of the United States Army should somehow be brought to bear against drug users and their providers with the same fervor and vigor. When the nation is in danger, as it is from the drug threat, extraordinary measures may be justified as long as there is no violation of the principles upon which our rights and freedoms are based.

There is one final thing: the nexus between military action and police action. In most of the countries in which we've operated where there was internal disorder and the military moved in to do something about it, a case for martial law developed immediately. Martial law means that the rights and the privileges of citizens are held in abeyance, and sometimes when the military is in control, the situation becomes worse than it would have if it had been left alone. Therefore, the requirement for a highly trained police force and the precession between military action and police action, smooth and regulated by law, is absolutely necessary.

"The highly honed language- and area-trained individual should be kept for jobs that require that kind of sensitivity. There should be an emphasis and a premium on that kind of development."

SW: *Do you think there will be wider use of special-operations forces?*

Yarborough: The term "special-operations forces" now takes in a much wider environment. Going after a hostage, or something similar to that, is a peripheral thing — it's something we have to do. The failure of Desert One was the reason Congress mandated that we have a Special Operations Command. Desert One was a simple operation compared to some of the political-military, quasi-military ones I've been talking about. That straightforward kind of thing has been done time and time again. We can produce the people for that, there's no problem there. But to produce the people who have the finesse, the understanding and the sensitivity to produce a set of rules, regulations and laws that allow the military to have one leg in the political arena without doing violence to our national structure — that's the challenge.

SW: *Have you noticed many changes in Special Forces soldiers since the late 1960s?*

Yarborough: I still think they're the most magnificently picked people that the nation has ever had. I have never been prouder in my life of being a part of any organization or philosophy than of my alignment with Special Forces. I've seen these guys all over the world. They have integrity and maturity and understanding — it's like a doctor knowing when *not* to do something. I have some pictures of our Green Berets working in a leper colony in Vietnam. That, to me, was the epitome of dedication and compassion. They weren't going to get anything out of those guys, not even a letter of commendation. I felt we had chosen our men so carefully, that what they were doing they were doing because they knew it was right and that it would reflect well on the United States. I don't think any country has ever produced anything like them.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Special Forces SFCs face greater competition for promotion

The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, has expressed concern that SF sergeants first class understand the increasing competition for promotion to master sergeant. The SF promotion population for master sergeant now comprises approximately 1,100 SFCs in the three primary zones. Special Forces has 692 authorizations for master sergeants, and approximately 85 positions are normally available through attrition. The "select" objective mandated by the Department of the Army is usually 85 percent or less of the number of authorized slots for promotion. As the proponent for Special Forces, General Shachnow has recently approved Chapters 13, 14, and 15 of DA Pamphlet 600-25, *Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide*, expected to be fielded this fiscal year. Promotion boards will use Chapter 13 to determine the Special Forces categories "fully qualified" and "exceptionally qualified" as criteria for promotion to master sergeant. All SFCs should know the criteria for these categories; they should talk with their team sergeants and sergeants major for guidance and take necessary steps now to ensure they will be competitive among the growing numbers in the zones. The fast-moving promotion pace for Special Forces was needed when the force was growing. As the growth period ends, promotions will slow to a rate commensurate with the attrition of the force.

PERSCOM points of contact

The following points of contact reflect recent changes in the staff of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch:

Capt. Adrian Erckenbrack	SF Enlisted Branch chief
MSgt. Terry Palmore	Senior career adviser
SSgt. Stewart Marin	37F career adviser, CMF 18/37F NCOES manager
Ms. Jacqui Velasquez	3rd and 7th SF groups, SWCS, USASOC, SF Command, SATMO, 96th CA and ROTC assignments
Mrs. Faye Matheny	1st, 5th and 10 SF groups, and JRTC assignments
Ms. Dyna Amey	SFQC student manager

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the appropriate assignment managers and career-development questions to the senior career adviser. Students attending the SF Qualification Course who have questions on assignments should contact their student PAC. Questions regarding NCOES should first be directed to the SF group schools NCO. The new branch phone number is DSN 221-5395, commercial (703) 325-5395, fax -0524. Address correspondence to: Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0454.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

FA qualification improves officer potential

The proponent's vision for the officer population of the Special Forces Branch is full integration with the Army and joint communities. One of the requirements of this vision is the establishment of an officer population with the proper functional-area mix. There is currently a shortage of officers to fill key SF Branch-coded FA positions, both Army and joint. Furthermore, there is an insufficient inventory to perform FA jobs, Army and joint, outside the SOF community. SF officers in non-SOF FA assignments play a key role in the integration process. In an effort to establish an officer population with the proper FA mix, each year the Special Operations Proponency Office develops a functional-area breakdown for a year group's fifth year of service. For example, during the first quarter of FY 95, SOPO will prepare an analysis of officers in YG 89. Special Forces Branch then uses the SOPO data to assign a functional area to each officer in the target year group. The functional areas assigned to SF officers in their fifth year of service are Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs; Personnel Programs Management; Comptroller; Public Affairs; Foreign Area Officer; Operations Research and Systems Analysis; Force Development; Automation; and Operations, Plans and Training. The SF Branch sends each officer a preference statement, which the officer uses to indicate his FA preferences. Branch then assigns FAs on the basis of the officer's preference, academic degree, language background and file quality. SF officers should strive throughout their careers to become qualified in both their branch and functional area. By becoming FA qualified, the officer supports the entire integration process. He also returns to branch assignments with valuable knowledge and skills that support the SF mission. FA-qualified officers gain promotion potential and, in some cases, command opportunities. For more information, contact Maj. Daniel J. Adelstein, SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, phone DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (910) 432- 2415/9002.

SOPO releases news for SF warrant officers

The Special Operations Proponency Office of the Special Warfare Center and School has released the following items of interest to Special Forces Warrant Officers:

- MOS 180A is currently at 91 percent of its authorized inventory of Special Forces warrant officers. The implication of this increased strength level is fierce competition among all applicants in future selection boards. Commanders are encouraged to interview all prospective applicants prior to writing letters of recommendation. A letter of recommendation is a key endorsement of the applicant and should reflect the applicant's potential, experience and qualifications.
- Qualified NCOs who are considering applying for the Special Forces Warrant Officer Program must be cognizant of active-federal-service limitations and age-policy limitations. Headquarters, Department of the Army, allows the commanding general of USAJFKSWCS to waive

up to 12 years of AFS. SWCS will consider recommending waivers for exceptional applicants with up to 14 years of AFS. Active-component applicants must not be over the age of 36. Reserve-component applicants fall under an interim age policy, in effect until November 1995, capping an applicant's age at 42.

- A curriculum review board met recently to help refine the new Warrant Officer Advanced Course. Future CW3 selectees and CW3s who have not attended the WOAC will have the opportunity to do so. The WOAC, which emphasizes joint operations and planning, will add a unique credential to MOS 180A, and future senior warrants will be better able to adapt to the challenges of their operational environment.
- Forthcoming changes will affect MOS and principal duty titles for Special Forces warrant officers. The MOS title will be "Special Forces warrant officer." Principal duty titles for MOS 180A, to be used for Officer Efficiency Report and Officer Record Brief purposes, are: "assistant detachment commander," "company operations warrant officer," "battalion operations warrant officer," "group intelligence warrant officer" and "group operations warrant officer."
- All warrant officers should understand the difference between their MOS title and their principal duty title. The MOS title is not to be used as a principal duty title on OERs, ORBs and other documents that require a description of what you are doing, not what you are. Promotion boards will look for this distinction during the selection process.
- Senior warrant officers who wish to present a briefing on MOS 180A to their units, related to professional development, health of MOS 180A, recruiting and general information should contact the manager of MOS l80A for a mail-out briefing. This is a trial program to get the professional development information better disseminated to the field.
- The point of contact for all issues pertaining to the Special Forces Warrant Officer Program is CWO 3 Shaun P. Driscoll, JFKSWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, phone DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial 910-432-2415/9002.

CA Branch has highest RC selection rate to LTC

The Civil Affairs Branch had the highest selection rate for reserve-component majors considered for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1993. The 1993 Department of the Army promotion list revealed 29 reserve Civil Affairs majors promoted from a list of 43 eligible. The 67-percent selection rate was significantly higher than the 42-percent average promotion rate for all branches. "CA majors have exceeded the DA average every year for the last five years by a minimum of 15 percent," said Maj. Ronald Fiegle of the Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Proponency Office. Historically, about 60 percent of officers not selected for promotion have not completed the military education requirement, Fiegle said. Majors being considered for lieutenant colonel must have completed 50 percent of the Command and General Staff College courses. Evaluation reports and failure to meet physical fitness standards account for about 20 percent of officers not selected, Fiegle said.

Foreign SOF

Turkish SOF train Azerbaijani forces

Renewed combat operations by Azerbaijani military units along the perimeters of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in the spring of 1994 resulted in some unexpected tactical successes against Armenian-held positions and ended — at least for a time — a long series of frustrating losses for the Azeris. Their former failures, characterized by operational- and tactical-level incompetence, appear to have been somewhat mitigated both by recent training provided by Turkish special-operations officers and by the rumored appearance of Afghan mujahedin. Pakistani mercenaries may also have been involved. Despite these small gains, any significant victories for Azeri forces in the near term can be safely ruled out. The Armenian forces within Nagorno-Karabakh continue to occupy the most favorable terrain and retain decisive advantages in military leadership, organization and motivation. Furthermore, political unity within Azerbaijan is lacking. The six-year struggle has already ruined the careers of many Azeri politicians, and they are reluctant to authorize decisive action for fear of losing major battles. The long-term implications of this local conflict, however, remain dangerous. Fighting, to date, has largely been confined to Azerbaijan and Armenia. But the competing interests of Turkey and an increasingly resurgent Russia could result in a broader regional confrontation. In the past, fighting in this area has also caused Iran to deploy troops (commandos and conventional infantry) on its northern border ostensibly to protect its territory from the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.

Mexican insurgency seen from two views

Armed actions by the suddenly visible Zapata National Liberation Army, the EZLN, beginning on Jan. 1, 1994, in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas elicited many judgments about the composition and affiliations of the insurgent force. While uncertainties and ambiguities about most aspects of the Mexican insurgency abound, there are two sharply drawn and divergent views that frame some of the possibilities — an official Mexican government appraisal and assertions by the EZLN itself. On the one hand, the Mexican government has characterized the EZLN as a "highly ideological" organization composed of "extremist organizations" that include both Mexicans and foreigners, and which is motivated by a mixture of local and foreign interests. In this regard, the presence of 1970s Mexican revolutionaries together with guerrillas from "countries south of Mexico" were mentioned. While acknowledging the serious economic and social problems of Chiapas that have led to popular unrest among the Indian and peasant populations, Mexican government spokesmen take special note of the EZLN's "affinity toward other violent factions that operate in brother countries of Central America." They emphasize strong non-Indian outside influence and publicly reject the idea of an Indian uprising. Weapons — new and older automatic arms, rifles, shotguns and pistols — are identified as largely of U.S., Russian and United Kingdom manufacture. EZLN training and conduct are said to be governed by written disciplinary, planning, tactical, security and other materials. EZLN tactical

organization, according to government spokesmen, is based on "squads," each comprising a sergeant, corporal, radio operator, medical specialist and 20 combatants. Other organizational features include activist cells throughout Chiapas linked by citizens-band radios, some 15 training centers in southern Mexico, and "safe houses" and assembly centers for revolutionary indoctrination. A different view of the EZLN composition and affiliation is presented by the Zapatistas themselves: EZLN communiques and spokesmen stress their indigenous origins and goals. They insist that the EZLN has no foreign members and has not received any support or guidance from foreign insurgent movements or governments. EZLN troops and leaders are declared to be "mostly Chiapas Indians" along with Mexicans from other areas and social levels, who operate under the direction of the "Clandestine Indian Revolutionary Committee" — EZLN General Command. The EZLN is silent on its overall numbers, armament and support, but stresses its knowledge of the mountains, military training and large numbers of troops spread through the mountains. As the EZLN membership considers the peace accords and promises developed in direct talks with government representatives, and as the Mexican government looks to the August 1994 elections, the questions of EZLN motivations, intentions, strength and affiliations will remain central security issues for Mexico and its neighbors.

Infiltration operations continue into Tajikistan

Although severe 1994 winter weather reduced the scale and intensity of combat operations along the mountainous Tajik-Afghan border, infiltrations by the Tajik Islamist opposition based in Afghanistan continued during this period and on into the spring. Russian and Tajik intelligence reports also indicated that the rebels were concentrating forces in several northern provinces of Afghanistan where training camps prepare volunteers for future covert missions. The Islamic insurgents claim to be strengthening their positions for a new warm-weather offensive and once again are hinting that they have acquired advanced weapons "characterized by a substantial destructive capability" (i.e., Stinger and Milan). Such claims in the past have proven false. Nevertheless, public appeals by insurgent forces for more help from Arab and other Islamic states (Iran) have attracted the attention of the Russian government and media. Now, the Russian and Tajik governments fear that with the opening of the snow-covered mountain passes and the arrival of spring and summer weather, the rebels will begin receiving substantial reinforcements from northeastern Afghanistan for launching a new offensive to regain territory. It was recently revealed that in 1993, Russian troops in Tajikistan barely averted the destruction of the 330-foot high dam at the Nurek hydroelectric power station during a fire fight with the potential saboteurs. According to Russian estimates, thousands of square kilometers of land would have been flooded had insurgent plans been executed to detonate three explosive-filled trucks inside dam tunnels. Overall, while the insurgents constitute a less-than-sophisticated force, they clearly pose a serious threat to Tajikistan's stability. A protracted guerrilla war remains likely for the former Soviet republic.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lt. Col. John E. Sray of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

O&I training to become part of SFANCOC

The commander of the Special Warfare Center and School has directed that the current Special Forces Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant Course be merged into the SF Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course.

The decision is based on a study which concluded that tasks taught in the current SFAOISC are common to all CMF 18 MOSs. The change will ensure that all senior SF NCOs receive training in operations and intelligence skills.

The new SFANCOC course will be 18 weeks long, as opposed to the current eight weeks. It will be structured into four phases: three weeks of common leadership training, 12 weeks of CMF 18 common tasks, two weeks of MOS track training and a one-week field-training exercise. O&I subjects will be taught during the common-task phase.

The first SFANCOC class under the new concept will begin Oct. 1, 1994. Selection procedures for attendance will be the same as under the current Noncommissioned Officers Education System. Responsibility for conducting the course will remain with the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School NCO Academy.

To ensure that all SF NCOs who have already attended SFANCOC receive the necessary O&I training, SWCS has developed a 10-week Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Transition Course. The course is scheduled to begin in January 1995 and run through December 1996.

Units will receive quotas for the SFOITC through the normal schools-allocation channels and will maintain their own order-of-merit lists. SFANCOC graduates who have not attended SFAOISC may apply for the course.

SWCS is currently analyzing courses of action to address Special Forces warrant-officer concerns

U.S. Army photo

Students attending the SF O&I Course

such as the prerequisite of SFAOISC for acceptance into the Special Forces warrant officer program, according to CWO 3 Thomas Merrill of the Advanced Skills/SERE Development Branch. Candidates for warrant-officer training who have not received O&I training will be considered for the SFOITC on a case-by-case basis.

SWCS is also considering options for reserve-component soldiers, including consolidation of the now-separate RC SFANCOC and RC SFAOISC courses, Merrill said.

Graduates of the new SFANCOC will be awarded a secondary MOS of 18F40 in addition to a military education level coding of "T." As mission and personnel-management requirements dictate, unit commanders and the Enlisted Personnel Management Division, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, will direct that a soldier's secondary MOS of 18F40 be changed to his primary MOS.

SOCCE handbook provides interim doctrine

A new handbook provides interim doctrine for special operations command and control elements pending its incorporation into special-operations manuals.

The Special Operations Command and Control Element Handbook was published and distributed to the field on Feb. 23, 1994. It describes SOCCE duties, responsibilities, missions, mission-essential task lists, command and control and linkup operations, according to Steven Cook of the SWCS Doctrine Management Branch. A sample linkup annex is included in the handbook.

Major doctrinal changes included in the handbook are:

- The SOCCE will be placed under the tactical control of the supported general-purpose force.
- The SOCCE is the primary link from the general-purpose force to the SOF command-and-control structure.

• Command of the SOCCE and deployed SOF remains under the control of the joint-force special-operations component command.

A large portion of the handbook focuses on general-purpose-force operations. SOCCE personnel must be proficient in the tactics, techniques and procedures of general-purpose forces, usually at the corps level, Cook said.

Local reproduction of the handbook is authorized to ensure widespread dissemination and integration of SOCCE operations into Army systems. The proponent for the handbook is the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. For more information contact Steven Cook, Doctrine Management Branch, SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine, at DSN 239-8689/5393, commercial (910) 432-8689/5393.

USASOC soldiers receive nation's highest honor

The Medal of Honor was posthumously awarded to two U.S. Army Special Operations Command soldiers by the President of the United States May 23.

The nation's highest honor was awarded to MSgt. Gary I. Gordon, 33, and SFC Randall D. Shughart, 35, for their actions during the attempted rescue of a downed helicopter crew in Mogadishu, Somalia. Carmen R. Gordon and Stephanie A. Shughart accepted their husbands' awards, the first Medals of Honor to be awarded since the Vietnam war.

During the Oct. 3, 1993, firefight in Mogadishu, Gordon and Shughart volunteered to be put down near a crippled Blackhawk to ward off oncoming enemy and to provide medical care. Both soldiers died, while the pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, survived and was ultimately taken prisoner by a swarm of Somali fighters.

"They (Gordon and Shughart) performed one of the bravest acts I have ever witnessed," Durant said after his eventual release. "Without a doubt, I owe my life to these two brave men."

During the beginning of their seventh mission in Somalia, Gordon and Shughart provided cover fire to the Task Force Ranger soldiers below from a Blackhawk helicopter, USASOC officials said.

The two expert riflemen provided firepower for a combat search-and-rescue team who fast-roped in to secure a downed helicopter. When another helicopter crashed, Gordon and Shughart volunteered to go in at the second crash site.

"The two sergeants unhesitatingly volunteered to go to the aid of four critically wounded comrades at the second crash site despite being well aware of the growing number of enemy closing in on the site," officials said in a White House release.

Both Gordon and Shughart had served more than 14 years in the Army and were graduates of the Ranger School and the Special Forces Qualification Course. Gordon was a native of Lincoln, Maine. Shughart was a Lincoln, Neb., native who grew up in Newville, Pa. — *USASOC PAO*

SWCS to release ODA handbook

The Special Warfare Center and School will soon release for staffing a new handbook for Special Forces operational detachments to use as a field reference guide.

Intended primarily for Army SOF, *Special Forces Operational Detachment-A Handbook* addresses detachment cross-training tasks, as well as mission-planning guidelines, to make the SOF operator a more independent and self-supporting soldier.

The handbook describes key MOS tasks that should be trained by all detachment members. Once approved, the handbook will be produced in a pocket-sized format, printed on waterproof paper, and assembled with screw-type connectors inside a plastic cover. This format will enable soldiers to remove or add information directly applicable to their current mission.

For more information contact Capt. Robert C. Kolpien, SF Development Branch, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFKSWCS, at DSN 239-8286/9802, commercial (910) 432-8286/9802.

Videotape series explains antenna theory

A new three-part videotape series is available to help Special Forces communications sergeants select the proper antenna system for battlefield conditions.

The series, titled "Special Forces Antenna Theory and Wave Propagation," is designed to help SF communications sergeants analyze, reason and improvise under adverse conditions.

Produced by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the series uses 3-D graphics and videotaped exercises to present theories of radio-wave propagation, antennas and transmission lines, and antenna selection and construction, as they apply to communications equipment and missions of Special Forces.

Soldiers may request the videotapes through their local training audiovisual support center using the following titles, television tape numbers and product identification numbers:

Part I — "Radio Wave Propagation and Theory," TVT 31-8, PIN 706582; Part II — "Antenna and Transmission Line Theory," TVT 31-9, PIN 709205; Part III — "Antenna Selection and Construction," TVT 31-10, PIN 709206.

Book Reviews

Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy. *By Lucien S. Vandenbroucke. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. ISBN 0-19-504591-2. 257 pages. $35.*

In *Perilous Options* the author studies the question, "Why do U.S. forces have consistent failures at high-risk special operations?" Through his study, Lucien Vandenbroucke concludes that these operations contain a series of recurring deficiencies. The author's position in the Brookings Institute allowed him to conduct interviews with participants in both government and military operations.

The book examines four operations: the Bay of Pigs, the Son Tay Raid, the Mayaguez Rescue and Desert Storm. These operations are conspicuous for their lack of similarities. One was a CIA-led attempt to topple a government. Three are hostage/prisoner rescues, and of these, only two involved SOF. Many of Vandenbroucke's cited failures do not translate from one operation to the next. Instead, the author attempts to employ 20/20 hindsight in describing information, intelligence or decisions which should have been known or executed.

Vandenbroucke uses a narrow definition of strategic special operations. His operations are commando-type *coup de main* strikes, conducted under the highest political authority. Each operation reviewed was the result of an attempt to employ special operations to resolve a major foreign-policy crisis or failure. The impact of SOF operations such as strategic reconnaissance, foreign internal defense and direct action are not considered. Further, the author focuses only on failures and does not consider successes such as the 1954 CIA-led overthrow in Guatemala, the 1964 hostage rescue in the Congo or the noncombatant evacuation operation in Somalia. Vandenbroucke's explanation for this exclusion is suspect.



The author does perform an excellent job in developing some recurring problems, including unrealistic expectations, poor human intelligence, a lack of clear interagency coordination and poor planning analysis. The book demonstrates a need for immediate attention by the SOF community in three areas: First, improved coordination of SOF operations with other SOF, conventional forces and other national agencies. The book forces the reader to conclude that SOF still relies too heavily on ad hoc organizations to coordinate its activities. Second, the danger of inadequate inspection and oversight of high-risk operations. In each operation, the planners were allowed to assess risk and chances of success. As planners, these individuals became advocates for the plan. Never were assessments of the cost of failure and the feasibility conducted by uninvolved experts. Finally, political decision makers are not equipped to realistically evaluate a strategic operation in terms of likelihood of success, potential for failure and impact on future policy in the area of operations. Instead, these leaders engaged in "wishful thinking," assuming that all would go according to plan.

Additionally, Vandenbroucke invokes three areas where the SOF planner must "tell it like it is." First, we are obligated in presenting the political masters a realistic appraisal of the potential risks in our operations. We must refuse to estimate a percentage of success. In three of the operations studied, these arbitrary estimates provided the decision maker the basis of his "go" decisions. High-risk operations are a sequence of events. Failure at any phase likely means failure to all. Second, we must make our leaders aware of decision points and the point of no return. This candor will facilitate intervention by higher headquarters at the appropriate times. Finally, we must follow our own doctrine, which requires primary, alternate, contingency and emer-

gency planning. This doctrine forces us to plan for failures in the primary operational plan. The operations studied are conspicuous in having only one plan.

Perilous Options is well-written and makes an excellent read. It is recommended to national security leaders and military professionals as a first exposure to strategic operations; however, additional readings are necessary to give the reader a full appreciation of planning, risk assessment and lessons learned from these courageous undertakings.

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4th SOSC
Fort Shafter, Hawaii

The Commandos: The Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers. *By Douglas C. Waller. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. ISBN: 0-671-78717-9. 399 pages. $23.*

I was fully prepared to dislike this book, being immediately suspicious of works which claim to be the "inside story," especially when written by a journalist and outsider like Douglas Waller. But as I read, I found myself being won over.

Shortly after the Gulf War, Waller wrote a cover article for *Newsweek* on America's special-operations forces. His research for that article was, apparently, the genesis of this work. Through personal interviews with numerous members of America's special-operations community, Waller crafts a book that tells some very credible stories.

Waller provides chapters examining not only Gulf War special operations, but also the early training and education of the soldiers, sailors and airmen who performed those operations. In fact, this is one of the strengths of the book.

The author personally followed Special Forces soldiers in training through exercise Robin Sage — the final stage of SF training. He tells the story of the Navy SEALs' "Hell Week" in its entirety as seen through the eyes of one boat crew. He also rides with an Air Force CH-53 Pave Low helicopter crew as they train for low-level, night and pinpoint insertions and exfiltrations.

Determining the veracity of these stories is perhaps the first duty of the reviewer. I sought out some of those whose exploits in training and war are detailed in Waller's chapters. To date, they all agree



that, although the author missed some facts at the margins, the book as a whole is remarkably accurate.

In addition to SOF training, Waller details some of the Gulf War's better-known special-operations missions. These include Lt. Col. (now Col.) Rich Comer's 20th Special Operations Squadron joint mission to destroy two key Iraqi radar installations with Army Apache helicopters — this mission is generally thought of as the first planned combat action of Desert Storm.

Also included are CWO Chad Balvanz's and MSgt. Jeff Sim's compromised recon missions, subsequent firefights and hot exfiltrations from deep within Iraqi territory; Navy Lieutenant Tom Dietz's SEAL Team's deception of Mina Saud, which assisted in deceiving the Iraqis that a Marine amphibious assault was planned on the beaches of Kuwait; the Joint Special Operations Command's search for SCUDs in the western Iraqi desert and even a story about psychological operations — an absolutely critical, if often overlooked, capability.

Perhaps the author overreaches himself with his discussion of Gen. Carl Stiner's supposedly poorly crafted attempts to have SOF play a larger role in the Gulf War. Also of unknown veracity is Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's distrust of elite forces — although this perception is widely held to be factual in the SOF community. These things might be true, but the author provides little in the way of supporting evidence.

Overall, *Commandos* is readable, reasonably accurate and entertaining. Given the author's profession, it is understandable that it is written in journalistic style without footnotes, but for that reason, it is not recommended as a primary reference book for scholars.

Finally, and especially for those unfamiliar with the SOF community, the book provides a number of potentially informative insights into SOF — the target audience of *Commandos* is obviously "them" and not "us." The determination of whether or not this constitutes "the inside story" is up to the reader.

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Special Warfare

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